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PREFACE
This document constitutes one volume of the final report prepared under
Contract NAS9-9046 1 Space Station Safety Study, which was conducted by
the Aerospace Systems Division, Aerospace Group, The Boeing Company, under
the direction of the Advanced Projects Office, Advanced Missions Program
Office, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA. The ob,ject'.ve of the study was
to develop a management tool for evaluating conceptual designs of future
manned space systems from a safety viewpoint. This objective was achieved
through the application of methodical techniques, which are described
where necessary in appropriate volumes of this final report, for analyzing
space station safety problems. This work resulted in the development of
Crew Safety Guidelines which can be used in evaluating future space
station concepts.
In Phase I of the study, the work was directed toward a broad class of
space stations, using several specific configurations as examples, and
considering both crew safety and mission accomplishment as safety goals.
In May 1969, the study was redirected by NASA into Phase II to provide
more direct support to the NASA Phase B Future Space Station Study,
considering only crew safety as the safety goal. To the extent possible,
the work done in Phase I was revised and adapted to Phase II and all
documents of this final report, except as otherwise noted, include the
results from both phases. In both phases the study scope included only
on-orbit operations and not launch, boost, de-orbit, and recovery opera-
tions, or any operations of the logistics support system, except for
close-in rendezvous tend docking operations.
The approach taken in the study was to examine the space station from the
viewpoint of safety only, with the intent of identifying as cormlete a
list as possible of those measures which should be taken to maximize crew
safety. Also, and especially in Phase II, the study dealt primarily with
station concepts, rather than specific designs or hardware items. It was
not possible, and no attempt was made, to examine the impact of safety
measures on other important aspects of space station development, such as
cost, design difficulty, or operational suitability. As station develop-
ment proceeds, trade studies between safety measures and other factors will
be required and management decisions must be made as to the extent to which
other desirable features will be permitted to override safety measures.
The documents constituting the final study report are:
• D2-113070-4, Condensed Summary Report
• D2-113070 -5, Crew Safety Guidelines, Volumes I and II
0
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• D2-113070-•6, Supporting Analyses
• Analysis of Operations
• Experiment Program
• Traffic Patterns Analysis
• Human Requirements
• Meteoroid Penetration
• D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram
• D2-113070-10, Fault Tree Analysis
• D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis
Other documents produced during the study but not part of the final
report are:
• D2-113070-1, Detail Study Plan (Phase I only)
• D2-113070-2, Midterm Oral Report
• D2-113070-3, Final Oral Report
• D2-113070-7, Baseline Mission Description (Phase I only)
• D2-113070 -8, Baseline System Description (Phase I only)
The references applicable to this document are shown in Section 8.0.
However, all the references for those documents which comprise the final
study report are compiled in D2-113070 -5.
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ABSTRACT AND KEY WORDS
This document reports the results of work done in support of or as an
extension to the safety analyses, which were the principal output of the
study effort. Gross configuration concepts and layouts for the Phase B
Future Space Station and Space Base are shown. A brief analysis of Space
Station and Space Base operations is presented for the on-orbit phases
of the operation, including the relationship of the logistics support
vehicles to the station and base. The experiment package was reviewed
and hazards inherent to these experiments are identified. Crew distri-
bution at typical times was determined and crew traffic patterns in the
event of an emergency are shown. Problems of station contamination,
together with possible or probable contaminants, are discussed. Medical
requirements of the space station are reviewed briefly. The hazards and
probabilities of meteoroid penetrations are discussed.
KEY WORDS
artificial gravity 	 experiments	 rendezvous
chemicals	 human factors	 space base
contamination	 logistic vehicle	 space station
crew density	 medical
	
space suit
crew distribution	 meteoroids	 space tug
docking	 modules	 toxicology
escape routes	 operations	 traffic flow
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The majority of the effort on the Space Station Safety Study, hereafter
called the Safety Study, was devoted to an examination of hazards and the
identification of associated safety measures by using techniques such as
the fault tree and the logic diagram or by a review of subsystems. This
work is described in other documents of this report. In addition, some
lesser effort was necessary in support of the major tasks, either to
provide background and perspective for them or to explore specialized
areas, or both, the results of which are reported by this document. These
lesser efforts included: development of configuration concepts, analysis
of space station and space base operations, review of safety hazards of
the experiment program, analysis of typical crew distribution and activity,
review of contaminants and contamination hazards, review of medical prob-
lems, and analysis of meteoroid penetration hazards.
1.1	 GROSS CONFIGURATION CONCEPTS
A set of gross configuration layouts was prepared, showing one possible
space station and one possible space base configuration. They were based
on the Saturn V Single Launch Space Station design, modified to meet the
criteria presented in the NASA Space Station Program Definition (Phase B)
Statement of Work (Reference No. 92), hereafter called the Phase B Study.
1	
These layouts were prepared for reference only and were intended solely
-	 as a guide for our thinking for the remainder of the study effort. General
safety criteria were considered during the preparation of these layouts,
but, since they were prepared early in Phase II, they do not necessarily
reflect the safety measures identified during the final stages of the
study.
1.2	 ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS
The operations involved with. prelaunch, launch, and Earth orbit injection
(EOI) were identified but not reviewed in the analysis. A key forcing
function of the future space station is its lonb life, up to 10 years
versus 14 days for Apollo, with the resulting safety effects of long life.
Hence, a study ground rule stipulated that the majority of the effort be
expended in analyzing "on orbit" operations, i.e., from EOI through de-
orbiting of returning logistic vehicles.
In some cases an operation may be accomplished by any of various alterna-
tives. Selection of the optimum method would requtre trade studies con-
sidering aspects of the operation other than safety. Safety measures were
identified for hazards common to all space stations and operations that
could be predicted on the basis of our reference layouts, but further
analysis will be required when the definitive configuration is available.
C
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1.3	 EXPERIMENT PROGRAM
The experiment program reviewed in this study was that contained in the
Candidate Experiment Program for Manned Space Stations dated May 1, 1969
(Reference No. 14). A review was conducted of the general aspects of the
program to idenify hazards peculiar to the experiments. These hazards
were then compared with the hazards identified with the station itself,
to ensure that safety measures appropriate to the hazards had been
defined. These analysis results should be re-examined for completeness
when the detailed experiment program becomes available.
1.4	 TRAF'F'IC PATTERN ANALYSIS
During Phase I of the study, crew traffic patterns and crew activities
were examined by applying the Boeing Crew Activity Sequencing Program
(GASP) tc	 Saturn V Single Launch Space Station (SIBS). It was intended
that a mission _ -ment be reviewed which was of sufficient duration, e.g.,
30 to 60 days, to ensure identification of all probable hazards. Only the
preparations for this review were completed in Phase I. Ideally, Phase II
effort would have been of the same scope, but this would have required
information; on the Future Space Station configuration, mission, and experi-
ment package, at the saxe level of detail as was available for the SIBS.
Since the necessary detailed information would not be available until
late in the Phase B study, and too late for our purposes, it was decided
to simplify this analysis. By using "hand crank" procedures, CASP was
adapted to the space station configurations developed during the study.
A "typical day" was identified and four "worst cases" of crew distribution
during that day were developed. Safety measures to alleviate t hazards
associated with these worst cases were defined.
1.5	 HUMAN REQUIREMENTS
Human factors and biotechnology support was directly available to all
team members, as required by their work, and is, therefore, implicit in
this and the other volumes of this report. An analysis was made of space
station contamination problems, with attention to potential contaminants
and their effects on crew safety. Medical considerations of the space
station were reviewed, with attention to the aspects of both preventive
and clinical medicine.
1.6	 METEOROID PENETRATION
The meteoroid penetration analysis was initiated early in Phase I, using
the SLSS baseline data. Late in Phase II it was up-dateA to incorporate
the space station configuration concept. An estimate of wall size for
meteoroid protection was prepared and the hazards associated with meteoroid
penetration, if one occurs, were defined.
- 2 -
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2.0 CONFIGURATION CONCEPTS
	
2.1
	 INTRODUCTION
Space station safety can be studied to some degree independently of any
particular configuration, since many hazards, such as those associated
with fire, decompression, and radiation, have aspects that are not
configuration-oriented. However, as the work proceeds into more detail,
a need develops fcr at least a gross configuration concept, to direct
attention to specific problems and serve as a check against the work
already done. In Phase I, three configurations were specified (Reference
No. 93 ) : the Saturn V Single Launch Space Station (SLSS), the Earth
Orbital Space Station (EOSS), and the rotating, artificial-gravity station
concept (JAG-1). These configurations were not specified for Phase II.
Gross configuration layouts were prepared for Phase II by adapting the SLSS
concept (Reference No. 81) to the Phase B Study Work Statement (Reference
No. 92) and included a single concept each for the space station and the
space base. The layouts, with reasons for their selection, are presented
and described in succeeding parts of this section.
	
2.2	 CONFIGURATION SELECTION
The single concept to be used for the space station was selected to adapt
the 6-man SLSS configuration to the 12-man concepts expressed in the Phase B
Statement of Work, and does not depart significantly from that statement of
work. No attempt was made, however, to define and/or depict the means of
obtaining artificial gravity or the means of access to the zero-gravity
hub, or center of rotation.
No attempt was made to design the space station so that it could be in-
corporated directly into the space base. Rather, the space station was
assumed to be a prototype of some parts of the space base, this assumption
be:t.ng based primarily on subjective opinion. The reasoning here was,
first, that the 12-man space station, as configured for the purposes of
this study, including all its features, such as crew quarters, docking
ports, experiment areas, and the like, did not appear to match readily
and obviously with any portion of the space base. Second, it was assumed
that the space station would be operational for a period of years before
the space base was activated. The space station would then be approaching
the end of its design life. Accordingly, it would appear to be impractical
to modify or repair it to equal the design life of other components of the
space base. Third, it can be e)q^ected that the operation of the space
station will reveal shortcomings or deficiencies which it would be
desirable to correct in the space rase.
Selection of the single space base concept was more difficult than for the
space station, primarily because of the multiplicity of concepts which
could be con::idered as potential candidates. Primarily on the basis again
of subjective opinion, a "Y" configuration was selected in which crew
- 3 -
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quarters, maintenance facilities, and some laboratories are located in
the tail of the "Y"; nuclear power systems are at the ends of the arms of
the "Y"; and docking facilities, zero-gravity laboratories, and storage
facilities are in a central, non-rotating hub. The arms of the "Y" are
adjustable as to angle and length. It was believed that problems of
dynamic balance caused by crew or equipment movement within the station
would probably be more easily resolved by a "Y" than by other possi-
bilities, such as straight-line. At the same time, hazards related to
the nuclear power supply appear to be more readily resolvable with a "Y"
than with other configurations, such as a circle or star.
2.3	 TWELVE-MAN SPACE STATION
Figure 2-1 is a layout of the 12-man space station used in this study.
As previously stated, the configuration shown was based on the Saturn V
Single Launch Space Station, adapted to the criteria of the NASA Phase B
Space Station Program Definition Statement of Work (Reference No. 92).
Externally mounted experiment hardware is not shown, nor a means of
conducting artificial-gravity experiments.
The 12-man crew is housed in a five-deck space station 33 feet in diameter
and 53.5 feet long. The station includes an outer pressure vessel, or
module, 33 feet in diameter with meteoroid protection provisions, and an
inner pressure vessel, or module, 15 feet in diameter. Each deck, in-
cluding the center section, is a separate pressure deck which can be
isolated and environmentally controlled. The inner module serves as a
sanctuary during periods of high radiation and/or during an emergency in
some segment of the outer module.
2.3.1	 DECK 1---LOGISTICS AND SPARES STORAGE DECK
This deck is the logistics and spares storage area. It contains four
logistics docking ports, unpressurized storage, and pressurized transfer
for crew and cargo. Cargo may be brought directly into the center module
via the airlocks and distributed to the remainder of the station, or it
may be taken directly into the unpressurized storage area. Two airlocks
are provided which permit various routes for cargo transfer. The center
module on this deck contains pressure suit and portable life support
system (PISS) storage areas.
2.3.2
	 DECK 2---GENERAL LABORATORY DECK
The outer module on this deck contains a physical science laboratory,
14.7-psi bioscience laboratory, bioscience work center, advanced tech-
nology laboratory, and photo laboratory. There are four experiment
module docking ports which also serve as emergency EVA hatches. The
inner module contains an emergency head and waste management system,
emergency expendables storage, communications center, and emergency bunks.
- 4 -
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2.3.3	 DECK 3---SUBSYSTEMS AND SHOP DECK
The outer module contains the electric power subsystem, the environmental
control subsystem for all outer modules, and the water management sub-
system, as well as calibration, check-out, maintenance, and repair facili-
ties. The deck also contai,-. an emergency EVA and docking port. The
inner module contains the enviro.mental control subsystem for all inner
modules. This subsystem deck was :centrally located in the space station
to minimize plumbing and cabling lengths
	
2.3.4	 DECK 4---CREW QUARTERS, GALLEY, COMMAND AND CONTROL
Six of the twelve staterooms are on this deck. Because of limited space,
all staterooms are identical in arrangement and have a minimum, but ade-
quate, floor area consistent with comfortable living. Each stateroom
contains a fold-up desk, chair, and two bunks, one bunk being for temporary
use in the event that doubling up is required during crew rotation. The
galley, dining, and food storage areas for all twelve crew members are
located on this deck. A two-man isolation ward with adjacent toilet and
personal hygiene facilities, plus a clinical ward (dispensary), are located
oil this deck. The inner module of this deck contains the command and
control and station monitoring console and has storage space for six
space suits and PLSS units.
	
2.3.5	 DECK 5---CREW QUARTERS AND WARDROOM
The other six of the twelve staterooms are located in the outer module on
this deck and are identical to the Deck 4 staterooms previously described.
The twelve staterooms were evenly divided between Decks 4 and 5, and
located on opposite sides of the space station, for safety reasons. A
large wardroom for exercise and recreation, plus toilet and personal
hygiene facilities, are also located on this deck. Six space suits and
PLSS units are located in the wardroom area where adequate space for suit
donning is available. The inner module contains data management equipment,
located directly above the command and control console, and has a large
open area for sanctuary purposes.
	
2.3.6
	 GENERAL
Two continuous raceways (tunnels) through the inner modules provide space
for routing of the numerous fluid lines (gases and liquids) and power and
signal cables required between decks. A 5-foot diameter opening through
the center of each deck provides the primary path for all inter-deck
travel in the station. Secondary (emergency) inter-deck travel is provided
through flush, floor hatches located in the outer module area. Travel
between the inner and outer modules on all decks is by means of two hatches,
one of which is large enough for transfer of cargo to and from the logistics
deck.
-7-
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2.4
	 SPACE BASE
Figure 2.2 shows the g ross layout of a 60-man space base. It would be
assembled in orbit, which requires a series of launches. The main ele-
ments include; zero-gravity hub, two nuclear power sources, and artifi-
cial gravity module. The zero-gravity hub contains laboratory space,
docking ports, storage, a hanger for artificial satellites, and various
subsystems. The two nuclear power sources are contained in the two
extendable arms, as shown in the layout. The arms supporting these power
sources may be individually extended, ret:L •acted, or their angles changed
to maintain dynamic balance. The artificial-gravity module's eight decks
contain crew living space, office space, and laboratory space. The internal
arrangement of the artificial-gravity module and zero-gravity hub are dis-
cussed in subsequent paragraphs.
2.4.1	 ZERO-GRAVITY HUB
-lhe zero-gravity hub (non-rotating) contains eight (NR-A, NR-B, and NR-1
through NR-6) decks devoted primarily to multi-disciplinary research and
development effort. Each deck contains an inner and outer mudule, each
being able to contain a habitable atmosphere. Two pressure hatches are
contained in each inner module fur access to the uuter module, as well as
five-foot diameter hatcher between decks.
The zero-gravity hub is divided into two parts, each being separated from
the other by the rotating module interface joint. A brief description of
each deck follows.
2.4.1.1	 DECKS NR-A AND NR-B
Deck NR-A, which is located above the rotating ,joint, contains the space
astronomy lab work area and the airlocks for access to the space tele-
scopes, detectors, and sensors. These space telescopes, sensors, and
detector modules are located in the outer module of Deck NR-B. The re-
maining volume in this outer module is utilized as unpressurized storage
area. The inner module of Deck NR-B contains an emergency logistics dock-
ing port.
2.4.1.2	 DECK NR-1
The outer module contains a high-energy cosmic ray physics laboratory and
biomedicine laboratory. The inner module contains electric power condition-
ing and distribution units and the environmental control unit for all
equipment cooling.
2.4.1.3	 DECK NR-2
The outer module on this deck contains an optical laboratory and a space
materials and processing facilities work area, as well as a pressure
chamber which has O-psia capabilities for space materials and processing
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experiments. The inner module contains a six-man emergency crew refuge
area and spare parts storage.
2.4.1.4
	 DECK NR -3
This deck contains the subsystems required to support the zero-gravity
hub. The outer module contains battery, electrical power, water management,
and environmental control units which condition all outer module decks. A
calibration, maintenance, and repair shop is also located in the outer
module. The inner module contains an environmental control unit which
conditions all zero-gravity inner module decks. Waste management, head,
PLSS and suit storage areas are also located in the inner module.
2.4.1.5	 DECK NR-4
The outer module contains bioscience, physical science, advanced tech-
nology, and general experiment work centers. An isolated 14.7-psia bio-
science laboratory is also provided. The inner module provides crew
refuge (bunks, emergency expendables, head and waste management), as well
as a scientific communication center.
2.4.1.6
	 DECK NR -5
The outer module is devoted primarily to the space applications work
center which supports the Earth sensing mcdule located in Deck NR -6. Four
logistic docking ports are located on this deck, with the remaining space
alloted to expendables storage. The inner module contains storage for
six PLSS and suits.
2.4.1.7
	 DECK NR -6
The outer module contains the Earth sensing module and two cryogenic
storage areas with the remaining volmme devoted to satellite maintenance
and storage. The inner module is used primarily for satellite docking.
2.4.2	 SPACE BASE ARTIFICIAL-GRAVITY MODULE
This eight-deck rotating module is devoted primarily to crew living quarters
(eating, sleeping, recreation/exercise, training). The space base command
and control and base monitoring center and five experiment/laboratory
stations have also been located in this module, since artificial gravity
is desirable or required for these functions. A five-foot diameter opening
through the center of each deck provides the primary path for all inter-
deck travel in this module. This center opening contains both an elevator
and a ladder, which extend upward to the space base hub. Secondary
(emergency) inter-deck travel is provided through flush, floor hatches
located in the outer module area. Travel between the inner and outer
modules on any deck is by means of two hatches, one of which is large
enough for transfer of cargo handled by the elevator. Four continuous
raceways (tunnels) through the inner modules and one through the outer
- 15 -
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modules provide space for routing the numerous fluid lines (gases and
liquids) and power and signal cables required between decks and between
the artificial- and zero-gravity modules of the space base. Considerable
unassigned storage areas are available on all eight decks. Features of
each of the eight decks follow:
	
2.4.2.1	 DECKS R-1 THROUGH R -4
The outer module of these decks contains the staterooms for the sixty
crew members, with personal hygiene area and heads located on each deck.
Staterooms vary in size and arrangement to accommodate the various ranks
and duties of the crew members. A space suit for each member is stored
in his assigned stateroom. The inner modules of these decks are used
primarily for PISS storage and the storage of emergency provisions, should
crew isolation in the inner modules become necessary.
	
2.4.2.2
	 DECK R-5
This de,.s contains the dining, food storage, and food preparation areas
required to accommodate the entire crew. Folding partitions are spaced
between dining tables to permit private use for meetings, etc. Heads and
a personal hygiene area are also provided. The inner module contains PLSS
storage.
	
2.4.2.3	 DECK R -6
The outer module of this deck contains a crew recreation/ exercise area, a
motion picture projection and viewing area for training and recreation
purposes, an isolation ward with adjacent head and personal hygiene facili-
ties, and a clinical laboratory and dispensary. Space base command and
control and base monitoring systems are contained in the inner module.
	
2.4.2.4
	 DECK R -7
This deck contains the subsystems necessary for space base operation.
Areas are allocated for water management, waste management, attitude and
stability control, and electrical power systems. All electrical power
for use in the artificial-gravity module will be conducted from the
nuclear reactor power system to the regulating and conditioning equipment
on this deck prior to further distribution. Two environmental control
systems are contained on this deck, one for inner module and one for
outer module conditioning. A general shop area and a calibration/mainte-
nance/check-out/repair station are also located in the outer module. Data
management equipment is located in the inner module, directly below the
base command and control station on the above deck (R-6).
	
2.4.2.5	 DECK R-8
The outer module on this deck contains five experiment/laboratory stations
which can be outfitted as required to conduct tests that favor an Earth
- 16 -
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gravity environment (e.g. ) wet chemistry, physics, geodesy, photography,
biosciences). The space in the inner module is unassigned and could be
used for storage, such as laboratory supplies and equipment.
C
C
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3.0 ANALYSIS OF OPMATIONS
	
3.1	 INTRODUCTION
One of the techniques employed during this study was an analysis of opera-
tions involved in the type of space mission described in the Phase B Study
Statement of Work (Reference No. 92). Its purpose is to complement other
analytical techniques, as noted in the Preface, in identifying hazards
which a crew may encounter during such a mission. Based on these hazards
a number of safety guidelines were developed (Reference D2-113070 -5) which
are intended to assist in the evaluation of designs of future long-duration
manned spacecraft, as well as in the preparation of mission rules, opera-
tional handbooks, etc.
Many of the operations are applicable to a broad range of manned space
vehicles and, hence, are unrelated to configuration. Others, however, are
influenced by specific concepts and mission objectives, as described in
the Phase B Study Statement of Work (Reference No. 92), and, in these
cases, the analysis was biased accordingly. Likewise, the influence of
previous and current space programs is apparent in the analysis, although
an effort was made to avoid excessive bias, since it is recognized that
continuation of the space program would inevitably antiquate a number of
the procedures, techniques, and designs currently being used. An example
of this is the docking technique and the frequent references to "soft" and
"hard" docking. Future technological advancement may eliminate a two-step
operation for the docking of orbiting vehicles by demonstrating the feasi-
bility of a sing.:; operation.
Section 2.0 of this document presents a single concept each for the space
station and the space base. These concepts did not contemplate incorporat-
ing the original space station directly into the space base, for the
reasons stated therein. The alternatives considered in the Operations
Analysis for the evolution and build-up of the space base, however, do
include use of the original station as the basic module for the base,
should this be the final choice.
The analysis involved establishing a series of Operational Flow Diagrams
depicting the major on-orbit operations involved in various phases of the
proposed mission. These are presented in several different figures through-
out this report, and referred to in the appropriate operation description.
	
3.2	 SPACE STATION OPERATION
Figure 3-1 is a flow diagram depicting the probable operations involving
the space station from before launch, through establishment of the zero-
gravity experiment program. In accordance with the study ground rules,
however, only the on-orbit operations (shaded block:) were analyzed during
this study.
- 19 -
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The space station will be injected into orbit using the S-II second stage.
Following propulsion shut-down, the S-II will remain attached for later
use as a counterbalance for the space station during the artificial-gravity
phase of the mission. Stabilization of the combined space station/S-II
stage will be accomplished using the on-board Reaction Jet Control System
(RJCS). To ensure operability of the station prior to the first manning
launch, as many of the station's on-board subsystems as practical should
be remotely activated and checked out by mission control. These may include
environmental control, stabilization and control, telemetry, solar panel and
antenna deployment, access tunnel extension, and those power supplies re-
quired to maintain the space station in a predetermined quiescent mode
pending arrival of the first crew members. After mission control has
remote verification of satisfactory operation of activated subsystems, a
crew manning launch(es) will be made.
3.2.1
	 SPACE STATION MANNING
It was assumed that a sophisticated logistic system will be available to
support the manning and cargo supply requirements of the station by the
time period programmed. for the mission. As pointed out in Paragraph 3.4,
the initial manning may be accomplished by either an Apollo CSM or Gemini
Big "G," either of which could be maintained in a docked mode pending sub-
sequent use as a space tug. Whatever the decision, however, the manning
vehicle (logistic spacecraft or adaptable space tug) maneuvers are minimal.
Pending the development of an acceptable throttleable propulsion system,
minor velocity changes during close-in maneuvering will be accomplished by
using the spacecraft's Reaction Jet Control Subsystem (RJCS).
Initially, the crew should establish the
tion, using its RJCS to maintain attitude
the space station, while they inspect the
figuration; i.e., antenna and solar panel
extension of pressurized access tunnel, e
that the space station appears safe for
firms that telemetry data also indicates
initiate docking maneuvers.
vehicle in a station-keeping posi-
and a minimum safe distance from
 station for proper external con-
deployment, thermal covers/panels,
tc. When the crew is satisfied
manning, and mission control Ion-
a safe station, the crew will
3.2.2	 DOCKING
Routine docking operations will normally be performed by the crew of the
docking vehicle, supported by the station crew and/or station control
center. For the initial manning launch, of course, this support will not
be available and the functions performed by the space station must be
accomplished either from the manning vehicle or by remote control from
the ground control station.
Following the station-keeping maneuver, the vehicle crew will activate the
soft-docking mechanism and ccnfirm proper activation prior to making physi-
cal contact. The space station Docking Alignment Target, if required, will
be illuminated by the ground control center or the crew of the manning 	
is
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vehicle. The vehicle's RJCS will be used to close on the space station
and to make initial contact for soft docking. Prior to contact, however,
the crew should make a close-in inspection of the docking port to ensure
proper physical configuration; i.e., that the port is free of any physical
obstruction, docking mechanisms are in proper order, etc.
Following confirmation of soft docking, the crew will activate the hard-
dock mechanism to establish structural and pressure integrity of the
manning vehicle/space station interface. Confirmation of a successful
hard dock should be made by both the ground control center and the crew of
the docking vehicle.
3.2.3	 CREW TRANSFER
When docking has been completed, the crew will pressurize the transfer
tunnel, using either the station's environmental control system (remotely
activated) or repressurization bottles on-board their vehicle. After the
crew confirms that the tunnel pressure is holding, the vehicle's access
hatch is removed and structural integrity of the interface confirmed by
visual observation. Electrical umbilicals between the two spacecraft
should be connected so that the crew may monitor the station's environment
for habitability prior to opening the station's access hatch.
To further verify space station safety prior to transfer of the entire crew
(Reference 3.2.4), a skeleton crew (1 or 2 crewmen) should transfer into
the space station and proceed with inspection and check-out. After the ad-
vance crew has completed its inspection and check-out, and has verified
that the station is ready and safe for operation, the remainder of the
crew will make preparations for transferring. The spacecraft will be
established in the desired quiescent mode. Those spacecraft subsystems
which will be used for backup or emergency use during space station opera-
tion should remain powered up. These subsystems may include communica-
tions, environmental control, etc. It is expected that power for these
subsystems would be obtained from the space station main power source.
3.2.+	 INSPECTION AND CHECK-OUT
Although station habitability will have been previously verified remotely,
iminent hazards may exist which instrumentation may not have detected.
Hence, it would seem prudent that an advance skeleton crew visually inspect
the interior of the station for these conditions, thereby precluding need-
less exposure by the entire crew. In consonance with a procedure which
is recommended to ensure operability of the communication subsystem, as well
as to maintain cognizance of crew disposition and status, the advance crew
should establish two-way communications with both the crewmen remaining in
the logistics vehicle and ground control. Using portable ch -ck-out equip-
ment as required, they should proceed to check the status/condition of
each deck/compartment for toxicity, damage, imminent hazards, etc. Major
It
subsystems should also be given a preliminary inspection for operability.
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3.2.5	 ADDITIONAL MANNING OR CREW ROTATION MISSIONS
In the event that additional launches are required to staff the space sta-
tion, the operations involved in such a mission, as well as those of a
.routing crew rotation mission, would be very similar to those described
in 3.'?.1 and 3.2.2, with the following exceptions. Station-keeping and
visual external inspection would not normally be required unless the in-
coming crew is requested to do so by the space station commander. The
space station crew and control center would be available to monitor and
support the docking maneuver. Finally, crew transfer would not normally
be a two-step operation unless communications with the space base have
been lost. (If this condition exists, it might indicate existence of a
serious emergency. The incoming crew should be alerted for a possible
rescue mission.)
Generally, space station crew activity and location within the station
should be restricted during the docking or arriving vehicles, whether they
be logistic spacecraft or space tugs, and during transfer of potentially
dangerous cargo (cryogens, pyrotechnics, etc.). Specifically, those com-
partments and crew stations adjacent to the docking port should be vacated
and the compartments sealed. Exceptions might be made in cases where an
experiment already in progress requires continuous operator monitoring.
This necessity could be minimized with prudent mission/program planning,
such that the arrival of logistic vehicles is scheduled to occur during
periods of reduced space station activity.
	 0
3.2.6
	 ESTABLISH ARTIFICIAL-GRAVITY MODE
Figure 3-2 depicts the concept offered in the Phase B Study Work Statement,
which was briefly analyzed, as a method for establishing an artificial-
gravity mode. The spent S-II stage is used as a counterbalance to estab-
lish a center of rotation at the in-board end of a boom which telescopes
from the station. Access to the zero-gravity environment at the center of
rotation is made through a pressurized tunnel integral to the boom. The
boom could be extended, pressurized, and checked out remotely by ground
control prior to manning, or this could be done by the crew after initial
manning.
Establishing the configuration shown, i.e., the S-II tethered in line with
the space station, and actual spin-up of the assembly will require extensive
trade studies to arrive at an optimum technique. Rearrangement of the
components, from launch to orbital configurations, as well as the spin-up
operation, might both be done remotely by ground control prior to the
first manning launch. The attractive feature of this approach, of course,
is that no personnel are exposed to the inherent hazards associated with
both operations. On the other hand, aside from the difficulties of remote-
controlled rearrangement, spinning-up the station prior to the manning
launch(es) presents the problem of having to dock with a non-rotating hub,
which snder the concept shown would be the center of rotation at the end
of the telescoping boom.
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The approach taken in the analysis was to do both operations (component
rearrangement and spin-up) after the first manning launch. A space tug
would be used to ferry and/or position the S-II counterbalance _rom aft
of the station to the desired distance and relative position (12 o'clock)
to the station (Reference 3.4). This approach makes the desirability
obvious of using the space tug as the initial manning vehicle (Reference
3.2.1). While the remainder of the crew stays aboard the station, a
minimum (1 or 2) crew would transfer into the tug, undock, maneuver to,
and dock with, the S-II. The latter would then be separated from the
station, and, thence, be maneuvered into the desired position. Cable
hook-up might require EVA support, but, here again, future studies may
reveal how this requirement can be negated. Boom and/or cable adjustment
to establish the proper spin axis could be done by the crew remaining
aboard the station. Prior to activation of the spin motors, the tug will
dock at the hub and its crew will transfer back into the station.
	
3.2.7	 ARTIFICIAL-GRAVITY PROGRAM
As currently planned, the initial phase of the space station mission will
be devoted primarily to the investigation of artificial gravity and its
effects on systems, operations, procedures, etc. Much of the equipment
design, operating techniques, crew procedures, etc., that will be used
during the space base mission, will rely heavily on the results obtained
during this phase of the space station mission. For example, it will be
essential to determine man's capabilities, as well as the effects upon his
performance, under frequent changes in gravity, as his activities take
him from the space station proper, with its 0.4- to 0.7-g environment, to
the center of rotation at the end of the pressurized boom, with its zero-
gravity environment.
A summation of objectives, equipment, and crew and station operations of
the experiments described in the Candidate Experiment Program for Manned
Space Stations (Reference No. 14) is presented in Section 4.0 of this
document. A review of the experiment programs suggests that the results
of experiment categories Biomedicine (A) and Engineering/Operations (F)
may most benefit the planning, design, and development of the follow-on
Space Base. Hence, it would seem logical that deliberate emphasis be
placed on these two categories during the early part of the space station
mission.
	
3.2.8	 COMPLETE ARTIFICIAL-GRAVITY PHASE
After completing the artificial-gravity phase of their mission, the space
station crew will secure from this mode, and establish the zero-gravity
mode for the next mission phase. Loose or stowable equipment should be
lashed or restrained, as required, to operate under a zero-gravity environ-
ment.
•
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The de-spin motors will be activated and the station stabilized. The
cabling/linkage to the S-II counterbalance will be disconnected and the
S-II disposed of. This could be accomplished by activation of the S-II
RJCS engines, and firing in retrograde to effect a de-orbit maneuver and
subsequent destruction upon reentry.
3.3
	
SPACE BASE OPERATIONS
Just as the space station mission will benefit by experience acquired in
previous manned space programs, so too will the space base draw heavily
on experience from the space station mission. It is presumed that one of
the objectives of the space base will be to further develop and refine
procedures, techniques, designs, etc., employed during the space station
mission. Consequently, an analysis at this time of space base operations
is subject to some uncertainty because of the likelihood that the final
space base concept may differ drastically from that assumed for the study.
Figures 3-3 and 3-4 are operational flow diagrams showing the space base
assembly and its activation and operation, respectively. Base operations
theoretically begin with activation of the initial module subsystems.
Obviously, if the decision is made to incorporate the original space sta-
tion into the base, the y, this would be merely a transition from the
original station mission to the start of the mission intended for the
space base. In such a case, it is possible that tha two missions may
overlap to a degree. If, however, the station does not become a part
of the space base, then orbit injection, check-out, and initial manning
of the initial launches module would presumably be very similar to these
same operations for the earlier space station.
Base operations could be incrementally expanded as subs,stem capacities
and capabilities are increased with the addition of subsequent modules.
Certain experiments requiring a zero-gravity environment and limited
subsystem support could be performed, thereby maximizing the benefits
derived during the lifetime of the base. Power requirements during the
base buildup prior to assembly and activation of the Nuclear Power Plant
could be obtained from the solar panels of the original space station.
Again, if the space station is not used in the space base, then these
solar panels might be detached from the station prior to its de-orbiting
and destruction. If this were the case, then this would be another
assignment for the space tug; i.e., maneuver and assist in connecting the
panels to the initial base module. The other alternative would be to
delay activation of modules subsequent to the initial one, pending com-
plete assembly of the entire base. At this time, total integrated sub-
system activation would occur.
Whichever alternative is selected (as a result of trade studies), the
subsystems of each module should be checked, functionally tested, and
integrated with the systems of previously assembled modules, before sub-
sequent ones are launched.
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3 . 3.1	 SPACE BASE ASSEMBLY
In considering the space base build-up sequence, no effort was expended
to establish an optimum launch sequence for the base modules, since this
would require consideration of such factors as mission planning and ob-
jectives, experimental program, equipment availability, crew training,
priority of benefits to be derived, etc., for which very little informa-
tion was available. Another influencing factor would be whether the
original space station is used as the initial space base module, or whether
a derivative of it is launched and used as the initial base module. It
seems prudent, hot ever, to plan that launch of the Nuclear Power Plant
components would be delayed, pending assembly and verification of oper-
ability of all other base modules (Reference 3.3.8).
The assembly of modules in space involves concepts for which no previous
experience exists. Different techniques for the modular build-up of a
space base were examined, predicated on the limited information available.
Although future trade studies may show that extensive use of a space tug
is not the optimum technique, this is the method which was selected for
investigation during the analysis (Reference 3.4).
The operations involved in securing, assembling, checking out, and test-
ing each module will be essentially the same for each unit; i.e., living
quarters, experiment laboratory(s), zero-gravity hub, nuclear power
sources, etc. Each module which is to have subsequent modules interfacing
with it, will have an integral hard dock mechanism that will enable it to
establish pressure and structural integrity between itself and the re-
ceived unit. Each module should have all subsystems thoroughly checked,
including integration testing with formerly assembled modules, before the
next unit is launched.
The initial module could be used as the operations center during the
assembly phase of the base, and succeeding modules attached to it. This
would permit its utilization as living quarters during this phase, prior
to activation of the total system of the base.
	
3.3.2	 DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE TUG
Assuming the space tug concept is accepted, it would be maintained in a
docked (to initial base module) mode between assignments. While in this
mode, its power requirements could be provided by the space base: As
each succeeding module of the base is launched, the tug would be deployed,
using routine undocking procedures (Reference 3.4.2).
	
3.3.3	 SECURE SPACE RASE MOWLES
Two alternatives were analyzed for getting the individual modules into
close proximity to the base, preparatory to hook-up: one involves a
ferrying operation by the tug, and the other assumes a propulsion system
for each module. If the tug is to be used, it will initiate a rendezvous
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maneuver, using its main propulsion system or its RJCS to effect velocity
changes. On-board radar and computer systems will be used, backed up by
data from equivalent systems aboard the space base, as well as at ground
control. The tug will establish a routine station-keeping position while
the crew makes a visual inspection of the module. Telemetry data relayed
to the tug from the space base and/or mission control will confirm status
of the module.
Normal docking procedures (Reference 3.4.3) will be used to dock to the
module and establish structural integrity, verified by talk-back indica-
tions. The tug's propulsion system will be used to ferry the module back
to the space base.
If the modules have their own propulsion system available for gross
maneuvering, this system could be activated by mission control or the
operations center of the space base to effect the rendezvous maneuver with
the base. Once the module was in close proximity with the base, the tug
would complete the assembly, using the station-keeping, inspection and
docking operations as previously described.
	
3.3.4	 MODULE ASSEMBLY
The tug will be used to effect final maneuvering and positioning of each
module for soft docking preparatory to hard dock operation. The hard
dock operation will be initiated by the operations center after all
stations have confirmed that soft docking has been completed satisfac-
torily. The hard-dock mechanism integral to the initial module and each
successive module will be activated to effect pressure and structural
integrity at the interface of the joining units. Once this has been
successfully accomplished the space tug will undock from the module and
redock at its own docking station.
	
3.3.5	 SPACE BASE ACTIVATION
Crew activity following hard docking of each successive module will be
basically the same. Normally pressurized compartments will be pressurized
from either internally-stored repressurization bottles or from the en-
vironmental control system of the original module(s). All module inter-
faces, including structural, as well as cables, umbilicals, etc., should
be inspected for integrity. This should be done remotely to the maximum
extent possible, or by an advance inspection team when required. When
the base crew is assured that the added module is safe, they could pro-
ceed to activate the module, integrating its subsystems with previ3us
modules.
The condition and received configuration of all equipment aboard the new
module should be checked. Stowed equipment, including its cargo of
expendables, should be inventoried. The crew will transfer cargo (as
required) into storage lockers of previous modules. Likewise, liquids
will be transferred into appropriate storage tanks.
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3.3.6	 EQUIPMENT CHECK-OUT AND FUNCTIONAL TEST
All equipment of the module (fixed and stowed) will be assembled and set
up to support the check-out and functional testing of the module sub-
systems, as well as future base operations. This should be done, to the
maximum extent possible, by using the automatic self-testing capability
of the equipment itself, supported by portable test equipment. Malfunc-
tioning equipment could be repaired or replaced as the on-board spares
inventory permits or in accordance with the established maintenance policy.
Inoperable or irreparable equipment should be reported to mission control
so that subsequent logistics support launches may include required spares
or replacement items in their cargo.
	
3.3.7	 SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION AND TESTING
After each of the subsystems has successfully passed functional testing,
it may be integrated with those of previously assembled modules, and
integration testing performed on the total system. This would permit
incremental expansion of crew activity and mission operations as subsystem
capacities and capabilities increase. When all available systems are
operating satisfactorily, the succeeding module may be launched, provided,
however, that unsatisfactory operation would not preclude a module launch
if the unsatisfactory condition was in process of being fixed and did not
jeopardize the module assembly.
	
3.3.8	 NUCLEAR POWER UNIT
It would seem prudent that launch of the Nuclear Power Plent components
would be delayed pending assembly of all other modules of the space base.
In any case, activation of the Nuclear Unit should occur only after all
modules were assembled. This would eliminate having to maneuver the large
modules through a "radiation safe" corridor during the base build-up.
	
3 . 3.9
	
ESTABLISH ARTIFICIAL-GRAVITY MODE
Preparations for space base spin-up should include adjustment of the
extension booms to establish dynamic balance and base rotation axis. All
loose or portable equipment should be secured to prevent its movement
within the base.
As the spin motors are activated, the crew should continuously monitor
(rrmotely) all module interfaces and plumbing connections carrying
hazardous materials (explosive, flammable, toxic, etc.) to ensure integ-
rity during the spin-up operation. Particularly, all interfaces at the
non-rotating hub joint should be stringently monitored. Consideration
should be giver to adding additional temporary instrumentation/cameras,
as required, to ensure continuous and complete monitoring of these inter-
faces. Crew location and activity during this phase should be restricted
to areas away from these interfaces and liquid/gas plumbing connections.
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Potential escape vehicles (logistic or space "tugs") should undock and
maintain a safe station-keeping distance from the base, leaving only a
skeleton crew aboard the base to man critical operating/monitoring sta-
tions. These stations should be isolated from module interfaces and
liquid/gas connections.
It was assumed that the artificial-gravity mode would be established early
in the life of the base, prior to a full crew complement being aboard.
This would permit all but the skeleton crew to leave the base via one or
two vehicles.
3.3.10	 ESTABLISH EXPERIMENT PROGRAM
Incremental implementation of the experiment program, utilizing the in-
creased capacity of base subsystems and additional equipment as modules
are added, would maximize flight data acquisition. Power requirements
and other subsystem support limitations would probably delay full imple-
mentation until activation of the Nuclear Power Unit and total integration
of base subsystems.
Experiment sequencing during the lifetime of the space base requires ex-
tensive analysis and trade study of many factors and alternatives (equip-
ment, availability, crew composition and training, priority of benefits
to be derived, etc.) and is beyond the scope of this study. As currently
envisioned, the program would include experiments integral to the base,
-	 externally mounted or tethered modules, and free-flying modules and
laboratories operating outside the base's sphere of influence (Reference
4.o).
3.4	 LOGISTIC VEHICLE/SPACE TUG OPERATION
Supporting the space station and base throughout their operating life will
require extensive and repeated use of logistics vehicles to perform re-
supply and crew rotation missions. Both the Apollo CSM and Gemini Big "G"
spacecraft were reviewed as candidates for fulfilling this requirement.
Without extensive modifications at considerable expense, it was considered
that neither vehicle has this capability, especially for the large space
base, thus mandating development of an advanced logistic system.
As discussed in previous paragraphs, the approach taken for on-orbit
maneuvering and docking of large modules was to use a space tug with a
minimum crew and maximum maneuverability. Additional applications of the
tug could be for ferrying or positioning and maintaining free-flying
laboratories, rescue of stranded EVA astronauts, inspection of other
satellites, etc. Though it would be desirable to have a common vehicle
capable of performing both the logistic and space tug functions, this
appears impractical due to widely dissimilar requirements. The large
cargo and multi-personnel carrying capability which a logistic vehicle
must have, as an example, does not appear to be a current requirement for
the space tug. Similarly, the reentry capability of the logistic vehicle
would not be a currently envisioned space tug requirement.
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It appears feasible, however, that either the Apollo CSM or the Big "G"
Gemini vehicle, or some variation of either, could be adapted for space
tug usage. Either could be used as an initial manning and/or cargo supply
launch, and then maintained in a docked mode until required during the
mission. This dual purpose would, at least partially, offset the expense
of an additional launch operation. In the light of these and other
factors, this is an area which warrants extensive trade studies before a
final decision is made.
'	 The use of a vehicle to maneuver and dock other vehicles is a relatively
unexplored area. Some experience has been acquired to date in maneuvering
two docked vehicles (Gemini-Agena and the Apollo CSM-Lunar Module), but no
experience exists in docking two vehicles with the use of a third self-
maneuvering vehicle. Hence, for the time being, this must be considered
one of the more hazardous operations for the mission being considered.
Heretofore, maneuvering of two docked vehicles has been relatively free
of directional restrictions; i.e., area boundaries within which it was
required to operate. In the case of the space base, however, the rotating
arms, as well as the presence of the Nuclear Power Unit, will necessitate
that all iL-oming vehicles restrict terminal rendezvous and close-in
maneuvering to a relatively narrow approach corridor to preclude collision
with the rotating arms or exposure to excessive radiation caused by
straying outside the radiation shielded area. This restriction wtJl be
particularly significant when a space tug is being used to ferry or
maneuver a laboratory module or other free-flying vehicles where vehicle
control is limited in order to avoid excessive structural loads at the
interface. Actual docking to a nonrotating hub of a spinning space base
will be essentially the same as with a nonspinning station. If the
logistic vehicle or space tug is bringing in a cargo module or an experi-
ment module/laboratory, this would first be "soft-docked" to an appropriate
port. "Hard-docking," if required for subsequent entry into the module,
would be accomplished by the base operators. The ferrying vehicle would
then undock from the module, and redock at its own assigned base docking
port.
The transfer of large quantities of cargo from logistic vehicles to the
space base will require the employment of new concepts. Hatches, through
which equipment can be taken aboard the base, will probably be considerably
larger than previous programs have required, in order to accommodate the
increased physical dimensions of this cargo---spares, test equipment,
experiments, food, etc. Actual movement of this bulky cargo will also
require new techniques. One approach to this might be an adaptation of
the track-mounted-and-palletized technique widely used in cargo handling
and transfer applications under 1-g conditions within the air-freight
industry. The large quantities of gaseous and liquid expendables that
will need to be transferred to the base also suggests requirements for
new or, at a minimum, a broader application of currently used plumbing,
valves, seals, pumps, etc.
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Until sur7h time as a high confidence level is achieved in the new hard-
ware, techniques, and procedures that will necessarily be employed on
future space missions, it would seem prudent th at a capability for total
cx-ew escape be provided during the space station mission. This might be
accomplished by mandating that some combination of logistic vehicles Bald
space tugs always be in a docked mode in whatever quantity required to
accommodate the total on-board crew. As currently envisioned, this same
provision would be impractical for a fully complemented space base. On
the other hand, by the time period currently predicted for the space base,
advanced technology may make mass evacuation quite feasible. Hence,
total crew escape from the space base, at least during the early phase
prior to fully staffing, should not be ruled out as a possible require-
ment.
3.4.1
	 DOCKING/UNDOCKING OPERATIONS
Repetitive docking and undocking maneuvers will be required with both
manned and unmanned vehicles (Reference Figure 3-5). Some of the dockings
will terminate only after both pressure and structural integrity have been
achieved. Others will require only structural integrity, as in the case
where merely a ferrying or positioning operation is being performed by
the space tug, and no crew or cargo transfer across the interface is
planned.
3.4.2
	 MOCKING
Crew preparation prior to deployment for any mission should include a
thorough briefing on equipment requirements, assignment 	 vehicle and
its current subsystem status, etc. If a de-orbit npere n is to be per-
formed by a logistic vehicle, the crew should be advir of the cargo they
will have aboard, as well as the status of Earth rec , .y forces, weather
in landing zone, etc. If the mission requires a spr 	 tug to perform
maintenance/calibration of co-orbiting or free-fly.' 3 modules, etc.,
appropriate spares, tools, and test equipment will be drawn. The crew
will then proceed to transfer to the vehicle via the station airlock.
Two-way communications should be established with both the control center
and mission control. On-board cargo (Earth return missions) will be in-
ventoried, followed by a cabin configuration check and initiation of sub-
system check-out/test sequence.
Tae forward transfer/pressure hatch will be emplaced, cabin atmosphere
stabilized, and umbilicals disconnected. The control center operator will
then release the hard-dock mechanism and the vehicle crew will activate
their RJCS for backing away and establishing an initial separatica dis-
tance.
•
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3.4.3	 DOCKING
Following the station-keeping maneuver (if required), the crew will a,,ti-
vate their soft-docking mechanism and receive confirmation that the
mechanism has been properly activated prior to making physical contact.
The space station/base docking alignment target will be illuminated by
the control center, to give the crew a visual reference during the
terminal docking phase. The vehicle's Reaction Jet Control System (RJCS)
will be used to close on the space station/base and to make initial
contact for soft-docking. Prior to contact, however, the crew should
make a close-in insepction of the docking port to ensure proper physical
configuration.
Following confirmation of soft-docking, the station/base control center
will activate the hard-dock mechanism (if crew or cargo transfer is
planned) to establish structural and pressure integrity of the logistic
vehicle interface. Confirmation of a successful hard-dock will be made
by both the control center and the crew of the docking vehicle. The
vehicle crew should establish desired cabin and subsystem configuration
while the transfer tunnels being pressurized from the space station/
base environmental control system. The crew will then proceed with removal
of forward hatch, umbilical hook-up, and transfer. If no transfer is to
be made, as during the course of most space tug missions, only structural
integrity need be established.
l
3.5	 SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM ARIA'S
Considerable experience in crew performance in a zero-gravity environment
has been accumulated during past manned flight operations. With the excep-
tion of the Apollo program, however, intravehicular crew activity has been
restricted to that which could be performed from the crewman's couch posi-
tion, requiring minimal physical motion or exertion on the part of the
(:rewmain. Crew movement and physical exertion increased significantly
during the Apollo program, particularly during transfer betiveen the
Command Service Module and the Lunar Module. Still, this activity is
limited when compared to the relative freedom of movement, and the nruch
broader spectrum of work/experiments to be performed during the space
station./base operation analyzed in this study, requiring a greater degree
of physical exertion.
A number of mission operations analyzed were considered likely to present
significant problems and require further review and eLialysis. 'These
include:(a) possible adverse crewman reaction to the excessive physical
movement, (b) crew traf.'ic flow, particularly under conditions requiring
rapid exiting of compartments, (c) maintenance operations---within the
space station/base, as well as or free-flying modules, (d) nuclear power
plant assembly and operation, (e) handling and transferring cargo between
the logistics vehicle and space station/base, (f) adaptation of Apollo CSM
or Gemini Big "G" for use as a possible space tug, and (g) development of
experiment timelines that would optimize use of all resources as they
become available throughout the mission.
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3.6	 DAMAGE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL
As was to be expected, the majority of the Crew Safety Guidelines derived
from the Space Station Safety Study are oriented toward preventing those
conditions or events which endanger the life and health of the crew mem-
bers. This emphasis is certainly justifiable, since the prevention of
emergencies is even more important it the hostile environment of Earth
orbit than in the more benign Earth environment. Even if all of these
it
	 guidelines are implemented, we can still expect a certain
number of unpredictable failures, some of which will jeopardize the safety
of the crew. One previous study of this subject has shown that a space
station on-orbit for one year could expect some 140 malfunctions or fail-
ures during the mission, with some requiring EVA (Reference No. 34). Crew
escape from inflight emergencies has been the subject for many industry
and government studies. It should be recognized, however, that unless
remedial action time car. be
 extended considerably beyond current estimates
and well organized efforts are taken to reduce the possibility of emer-
gencies propagating to catastrophic proportions, crew escape may be
rendered impossible. Ever. though it is likely that equipment reliability
and operating techniques will be advanced to improve survivability of
future space station crews, it would still seem mandatory that considerable
effort be expended to forestall the consequences of a failure, and to
contain and control danage resulting from such a failure. Paragraph 4.1
in D2-113070 -5
 lists those Crew Safety Guidelines (from the Space Station
Safety Study) which are judged to be related to Damage Containment and
Control. It is believed that utilization of these guidelines in the plan-
ning and design of future space stations would significantly contribute
to this ef{'^rt.
In the context of this study, damage has been broadly defined as the
breakage or failure of the station or any part of component thereof
(Reference No. 86). Containment and control refers to those measures
which: first, prevent damage, if it does occur, from escalating in
severity or spreading beyond the original site; and, secondly, restore
those station functions which have been interrupted or impaired by equip-
ment damage or failure, or, if that is impossible, allow attainment of a
safe condition and capability to continue the mission.
In manned space programs to date, high mission success has been achieved
primarily through design simplicity, equipment reliability for the short
mission durations, and redundant modes of operation. Spacecraft systems
were not designed to accommodate inflight repair. Generally, due to the
nature of the spacecraft (smaii size, restricted crew mobility, and
limited on-board tools, equipment, etc.) significant maintF- ce or repair
was not practical. Furtherilore, failures were more likely ,.,j occur during
the mission's critical operating phases when the crew was too busy to
perform auintenance. However, with the long-diAration space flights/
missio;.s projected in the future, since equipment failure probabilities
will be greatly increased, the system must be designed and the mission
planned so that there is a high probability that these failures will le
survivable.
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Any effort to develop a Spacecraft Damage Containment and Control program
must originate from a list of identified hazards which are tihen analyzed
to determine their probability of leading to spacecraft or failure or the
impairment of crew safety. Further analysis must then be done to deter-
mine: (a) effect or crew and/or vehicle, (b) remedial action time avail-
able, and (c) possible remedial actions to alleviate the effects of the
damage or failure and reduce its possibility of propagation to fatal
situations. Due to the limitations of this study effort, only the last
of these three objectives has been explored. It is strongly recommended
that all three of these objectives be given serious consideration for
future study efforts.
In selecting remedial action for any given emergency, the action must be
evaluated to ensure that it does not produce other situations which are
equivalent to, or more serious than the original emergency. Use of ex-
tinguishing agents to eliminate a fire, as an example, may contaminate the
space station to an unacceptable level. On the other hand, rapid decom-
pression of the compartment containing the fire may: (a) impart uncon-
trolled motion to the space s tation, (b) temporarily accelerate the
fire's progress due to the air velocity gradient resulting from the de-
pressurizing action, or (c) expose crew members and equipment to other
hazards unless precautions are taken (donning pressure suits and life
support devices, ensuring complete isolation of the compartment being
depressurized, etc.). Another example might be the removal of all or a
portion of electrical power as a measure to control an emergency. This
action might incapacitate the attitude control system, resulting in
vehicle instability, or cause loss of vital life support functions. It is
obvious then that numerous trade studies are required before optimum
remedial actions are selected. It is recognized, however, that real time
decisions of crew members may alter or use some appropriate combination of
remedial actions for the particular hazard being experienced.
3.6.1	 DAMAGE CONTAINMENT
Isolating or confining damage or failure at its origin is paramount to
control, if the latter is to be effective in eliminating the hazard, or
at least to provide a time span of sufficient duration to allow crew
escape. Isolation measures must be taken immediately and must be as
effective as possible. Crew training in this regard is imperative. In
many cases, particularly for critical hazards, the time differential
between the isolation and controlling functions must be so negligible
that they will, essentially, occur simultaneously.
Many of the features necessary for isolation are configuration-oriented
and, hence, should be specified for the station during the design and
development phases. Probably the most recognizable isolation technique
is the use of structural barriers which can be used to confine the damage
or failure at the original site. Providing tear or crack stoppers in the
basic structure, for example, would limit the hole size if the pressure
hull is pu.:ctures. The use of isolation and shut-off valves in fluid and
-39-
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gas systems is another obvious application of isolation. Flame arresters
built into environmental control system (ECS) or other ducting would halt
the propagation of fire from one compartrient to another.
High safety factors, whether they be in the form of structural features,
large quantities of on-board consumables, or generous subsystem capacities,
are passive design measures that can be taken to reduce the possibilities
of hazards propagating beyond the original site or escalating to catas-
trophic proportions. In a compartmented space station, itself a segmented
structural barrier, structures, seals, isolation valves, etc., must be
capable of withstanding rapid decompression if damage to adjacent compart-
ments or equipment is to be avoided. Similarly, the environmental control
system must have sufficient repressurization capacity to compensate for a
specified number of compartment depressurizations. Extra maneuvering fuel
must be provided to accommodate unknowns, such as loss due to plumbing
leakage or tank rupture.
Another, and possibly less obvious, method for preventing a hazard from
escalating to catastrophic proportions would be the reduction of station
activities to conserve the remaining capacity of a subsystem which has
been rendered partially inoperative by damage or failure. For example,
loss of maneuvering fuel (as mentioned above) for the attitude control
system might dictate that station reorientation maneuvers to accommodate
certain experimentation be reduced, in order to avoid depletion of the
remaining fuel and subsequent total loss of attitude control. Another
example might be the elimination of some noncritical station functions
following partial failure (or damage) of the electrical power subsystem,
to preclude overloading the remaining capacity of the subsystem and
possible total power failure.
3.6.2	 LIAMAM CONTROL
As used in this study, control means the restoration of station functions
which have been interrupted or impaired by equipment damage or failure,
or, if that is impossible, the attainment of a safe condition and capability
to continue the mission. Heretofore, this has been achieved primarily
througLL the use of redundancy measures, since this was generally sufficient
for short-duration missions. The type of  redundancy which is probably
most recognized is equipment or system redundancy. In theory, this car.
vary from employing 2 (or more) of everything, to providirq 2 of only the
most critical item aboard the station. Practically, however, it has been
shown, for one space station and mission configuration, that the weight
of the redundant systems is about 10 to 15 percent of the total vehicle
weight (Reference No. 45). Obviously, here again, extensive studies are
required to determine the optimum redundancy for future space stations.
There are several different ways to employ the redundancy technique. One
of the most common is parallel redundancy where two (or more) identical
pieces of equipment are connected ire parallel with the first, and both
(or all) operate simultaneously. The advantage of this system is that
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maintenance initiation is not urgent, since the system function continues
to be provided by the remaining component(s), even though one has been
damaged or rendered inoperative. Parallel redundancy is particularly
useful where no system downtime can be tolerated. It is inefficient,
however, in that it requires excessive spares if high system reliability
is to be achieved. Since all units in a parallel arrangement accumulate
operating time at the same rate, and experience the same operating condi-
tions and environment, their mean time to failure is identical.
A more efficient method is to maintain the redundant item in a ncnoperat-
ing (stand-by) mode, wherein it can be switched (or plugged) into the
system when the first unit fails or is damaged. In this method, mean
time to failure of the system is greatly increased, since the spare unit
remains in a nonoperating mode until the first unit fails. System downtime
is minimal and total spares requirements, although still considerable,
are less than for the parallel method.
A third type of redundancy, generally called "use redundancy," employs an
interchangeability feature of parts or components; i.e., those items which
perform similar functions are designed such that any one of them, or their
spares, have several placement options. Consider, for example, the multi-
ple application of pressure regulators, shut-off and check valves, and
pressure relief valves in a spacecraft's gaseous or fluid systems. Since
their functions are similar, if they were designed to accommodate inter-
changeability, the high reliability realized with stand-by redundancy
could be achieved, but with a significant reduction in snares requirements.
It is recognized that this technique may require that optimized equipment
be compromised in performance, weight, etc. Hence, extensive trade
studies should be performed after the specific mission has been defined
and specification requirements identified, to ensure that these parameters
are not unacceptably penalized.
Another attractive feature of this method is that it offers the advantage
of being able to borrow or "cannibalize" a component from a noncritical
or less critical system, in order to maintain operability of a critical
system. This method would also have application to whole systems. For
example, the normal crew quarters could be designed for use as an emer-
gency shelter. Similarly, docked logistic vehicles could be maintained
in some quiescent mode, and used to augment or replace damaged or inoper-
able space station systems.
As significant as redundancy will be in contributing to mission success,
for the long-duration missions planned for the future, in-flight or
'orbital" maintenance will still be required to assure continuous avail-
ability of operating systems and components. One study conducted by The
Boeing Company defines an optimum ratio of redundancy applications and
in-flight maintenance operations for manned spacecraft on long-duration
missions (Reference No. 43). It would seem prudent that this ratio be
used as a guide also for the particular mission and hardware configuration
being considered for future space station:bases.
C
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Preventive maintenance is scheduled primarily on the basis of failure
probabilities and function criticalities, and is initiated prior to any
failure or warning of impending or potential failure. Hence, this does
not become a concern of darige control. Occasionally, unscheduled pre-
vei.tive maintenance is initiated as a result of an indication of imminent
or potential failure or damage. A technique which may be useful in this
type of maintenance is Incipient Failure Detection Analysis in which
unique characteristics (electrical, acoustic) of parts or components are
used to warn of an impending failure. This also is not a major damage
control technique, although it is related, in that it could be a factor
in halting the propagation of a failure to catastrophic proportions.
The type of maintenance which is a major contribution to damage control
is corrective maintenance, i.e., returning a component or system to
readiness after it fails or is damaged unexpectedly. Under these condi-
tions, proper and rapid identification and evaluation of the hazard
criticality becomes the prime consideration in establishing the mainte-
nance level. Remedial action time available after some failures may be
so short, that the only alternative to allowing the situation to escwiate
to fatal proportions, is to have parallel redundancy, thus requiring nc;
crew effort. Other failures, however, may tolerate considerable compo-
nent repair time. As an example, failure of an electronic equipment
cooling system during periods when maximum A .uipment operation is required
might dictate that a remove and replace concept apply; however, during a 	 0period when the equipment is in a power-down mode, a lower level of
maintenance may be tolerable. Hence, a flexible maintenance level con-
cept might be warranted, depending upon equipment failure or damage
probabilities during different mission phases or operations, i.e., criti-
cal versus noncritical. Further analysis in this area should be conducted
during the design and development phase.
One approach to this problem mi ght be an adaptation of the "field level"
versus "depot level" maintenance concept employed in some complex weapon
systems. Under this concept, "on-the-spot" maintenance might be restricted
to "removal-and-replace," whereas a lower level of maintenance could be
performed in a well equipped on-board maintenance shop.
3.6.3	 F24ERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES
Many of the Damage Containment and Control measures mentioned thus far
are essentially emergency procedures which are initiated by the crew in
response to those situations where system functions or crew health has
been impaired, or is in aanger of impairment. It is obvious then that
these procedures ar: an integral part of any effective Damage Containment
and Control program. Generally speaking, emergency procedures can be
divided into three categories: (1) remedial actions which are taken
specifically to contain and control an emergency; (2) establishing the
mode or state under which the spacecraft and its crew may continue to
operate, following contai-ment and control of an emergency, until the
original configuration has been re-established and (3) crew escape or
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mission abort procedures. Each category represents a deviation from the
normal, and, though their implementation is unexpected, they must be
planned in parallel with the hardware design and mission planning phase.
The first category generally denotes a higher level of criticality, es-
pecially from a timing standpoint, since in some cases, if rapid imple-
mentation is not made, the other two may not be possible. The crew
escape (or mission abort) procedures may be equally as critical, on the
other hand, depending upon the degree of success (or lack of) of the first
two categories. Consider, for example, a parallel redundant atmospheric
CO2
 removal system, whereby one of the units fails. In this case, of
course, the system function continues to be provided by the remaining
operating unit and no emergency procedures would necessarily have been
implemented. On the other hand, if this condition dictated that some
station or crew activities be reduced or curtailed entirely, it would
represent an emergency operating mode of the category (2) type. Finally,
if the remaining unit either failed completely, or operated at less than
the required efficiency, it would probably dictate implementation of
escape or mission abort procedures.
3.6.4	 RECOMMENDATIONS OF AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Establishing an effective Damage Containment and Control program demands
consideration of a multitude of factors. The discussion here, althc..gh
knowingly general, has served to make the interrelationship of some of
these factors obvious. It is apparent also, that specific measures and
recommendations must await results of trade studies, predicated on specific
mission profiles and hardware configurations.
The following areas are those which appear to merit further study:
a. At what phase of the mission are the identified hazards most apt to
occur?
b. What are the probable immediate effects of these hazards?
c. What is the available remedial action time following the hazard
occurrence?'
d. What are the available remedial actions and their probable effective-
ness in containing and controlling the hazard?
e. What is the optimum ratio of redundancy usage and maintenance applica-
tions?
C
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4.0 EXPERIMENT PROGRAM
	
4.1	 INTRODUCTION
A gross review was made of the Candidate Experiment Program for Manned
Space Stations, dated 1 May 1969 (Reference No. 14), for the purpose of
identifying the associated hazards, particularly any that are unique or
peculiar to the conduct of the various experiments. The Functional Program
Element goals, the experiments, their location, equipment involved, re-
quired crew support, and number of repetitions are factors generally
identified in the experiment program, and are summarized in Table 4-1.
Also shown are the identified safety hazards associated with the experi-
ments and remarks, as appropriate.
	
4.2	 DISCUSSION
Table 4-1 is a useful tool in presenting the experiment program in a con-
densed format, and illustrates any currently recognized absence of informa-
tion on these factors. A detailed review of the safety problems inherent
in the finalized experiment program should be conducted to extend and
complete this report.
The experiment program is divided into Functional Program Elements (FPE)
within which the individual experiments are gros:ily grouped according to
two dominant features: (a) the individual experiments are mitually
supportive of a particular area of research or investigation, and (b) they
impose similar and related demands on supporting subsystems. In some of
the program elements, however, there is no apparent breakdown of specific
experiments and the element itself constitutes the experiment to be per-
formed. A case in point is the Cosmic Ray Physics Laboratory program
element, which has two stated objectives: primarily, to determine the
detailed properties of the high-energy cosmic-ray particles from 10 10 to
1015 electron volts and, secondarily, to use the very high-energy particles
in space to perform controlled laboratory experiments. In this and other
cases, these specific laboratory experiments could not be identified.
An item which should be taken into account in assessing safety is the
number of repetitions of a hazardous function. Several experiments require
the crew to retrieve or replace photographic film. Assuming an on-board
film processing facility, this crew function would imply use of, and ex-
posure to, hazardous chemicals. However, the Candidate Experiment Program
did not identify the number of repetitions of this function. The servicing
of free-flying experiment modules suggests the transfer of cryogens from
the space station/base after the two vehicles have docked. Both cryogen
transfer and docking are considered particularly hazardous with special
precautions required. Information on frequency of the operations is
necessary before a final analysis can be made.
z
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Others factors which should be extensively reviewed in order to maximize
confidence that all conceivable hazards have been considered include
basic skills of participating crewmen, crew training, equipment reliability,
predicted maintenance requirements, the mission phase in which the experi-
ment will be performed, etc. These analyses should be implemented as soon
as requisite information is available.
While a detailed analysis was impossible, it was obvious that a number of
the experiments do involve hazards. These include the handling of chemi-
cals, docking and undocking of free-flying modules, use of high voltages,
use of high temperatures, cryogen transfer, and EVA. No experiment-
related hazard was identified, however, which had not already been covered
by other tasks in the study. For example, use and control of chemicals
has been covered in Section 6.0 of this document and by the Subsystems
Analysis (D2-113070-11). The applicable guidelines are documented under
the "Contamination" Hazard Group in D2-113070 -5. Similarly, the use of
high voltages and high temperatures is covered by the Fault Tree Analysis
technique (D2-113070-10) and documented in D2-113070 -5 under the "Electri-
cal" and "Temperature Extremes" Hazard Groups, respectively. Docking and
undocking hazards are covered in the Analysis of Operations (Section 3.0
of this document), with the Crew Safety Guidelines in D2-113070 -5 cross-
referenced under the "Operations" function. Cryogen transfer and EVA are
also covered under the "Operations" function.
On the other hand, many of the experiments did not appear to involve any
particular hazards. For example, those which comprise the Life Support
and Protective System FPE do not in themselves sufgest specific hazards.
Rather, they appear to be oriented toward the development and effective-
ness determination of control and monitoring techniques related to vital
space base and life support functions.
4.3	 CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of the information available at the time of the study, there
are no apparent hazards associated with the experiment program which are
peculiar to the experiments. The hazards identified, and the measures
required to guard against them, had already been recognized by other tasks
in the study. As the experiment program is developed in the future, a
further review should be made to insure that unique hazards, if they develop,
are recognized and provisions made to safeguard against them.
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FUNCTIONAL PROGRAM
ELEMENT GOALS EXPERIMENT LOCATION EQUIPMENT
GRAZING-INCIDENCE X-RAY TELESCOPE - X-ray polarimeter Remote - X-ray polarimeter - Top
- CLSVed crystal X-ray mod-:l.e - Curved crystal - Mor
- Provide high spatial resolution spectrometer spectrometer - Per
of X-ray sources
- High resolution - X-ray imaging - Mori
- Obtain detailed spectral data studies of X-ray device ing
- Obtain polarization data sources
- Provide technology base for
design and operation of larger
grazing-incidence telescopes
STELLAR ASTRONOMY MODULE - Manned astronomical - Remote - Cassegrainian - Tar
space telescope module telescope and
- Observe stellar objects in the (MAST) - Ci.a
900 R - 3300 R spectral region - Per
- Evaluate performance of manned bos
space telescopes and control - Mori
systems doc
- Develop and evaluate operational - Iss
techniques and design philoso- kee
phies - Ini
and
SOLAR ASTRONOMY MODULE - Photoheliograph - Remote cm - Camera systems - Ali
- UV long wavelength attached a Ultraviolet ner
- Extend knowledge of solar spectrometer a Hydrogen-alpha - Mon
phenomenon - X-ray spectrohelio- • White light - Chc
- Evaluate performance of manned graph - W long wave- obs
space telescopes and control - Hydrogen alpha length spectro- - Mon
systems telescope meter ing
- Develop and evaluate operation - Spectroheliograph tic
techniques and design philoso- assembly - Cha
phies • X-ray imaging - Iss
device kee
• Collimated plan
crystal spectro
meter
• Johann mount
crystal spectro
meter
- H2-alpha. telesco
fbLIDMT FRAIVic
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TABLE 4-1 CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM
CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPETITION REMARKS
- Top off cryostat - Transferring of - Every 90
- Mon.*tor operation cryogens days cr
- Perform maintenance - Rendezvous and as
- Monitor and/or assist in dock- docking of labora- required
irg operation tory mode-e - Initial
activati
plus as
required
for main-
tenance
- Target selection, acquisition s - Rendezvous and - As
and recognition decking of module required
- Change film and develop - Transferring of for
- Perform calibration and on- cryogens mainte-
board maintenance - Exposure to chemi- nance,
- Monitor and/or assist in cals etc.
docking operation
- Issue commands for station-
keeping maneuvers
- Initiate automatic rendezvous
and docking
- Align and focus optical compo- - Rendezvous and - Not - Module of same
nents docking of module available design as for
- Monitor and maintain equipment (remote ope-ation) stellar astronomy
- Choose solar region to be - Transferring of module
olbserved cryog-ns
- Monitor and/or assist in dock- Exposure to chemi-
ing operation (remote opera- cals
Lion)
- Change film
- Issue commands for station-
keeping maneuvers
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FUNCTIONAL PROGRAM
ELEMENT GOALS EXPERIMENT LOCATION EQUIPMENT
SMALL VERTEBRATES (BIO D) Role of Gravity - Internal 0-g experiments -
- In cardiovascular to space area -
- Provide data to facilitate- function station/ On-board research
understanding of the ftmdamental - In embryogenesis, base OR biocentrif.ge -
role gravity plays Ln all parturition, grow th, perma-- PhotogTaphic equip-
aspects of physiology, bio- development, metabo- nently ment, TV, etc.
chemistry, and behavior of small lism, and aging in docked
vertebrates throughout their rodents
life cycle - In immune responses
- Demonstrate, in a fully opera- of mammals
tional mode, man's ability tc - In embryogenesis and
provide scientific responsive- development in
ness and flexibility in future amphibia
orbiting space biology labora- - In growth and metabo
tories lism in reptiles
- In hibernation
Influence of
- Gravity on behavior
in mammal s
- Geophysical factors
on biorhythms in
vertebrates
PLANT SPECIMEDTS (BIO E) - Plant responses from - Internal On-board ^entrifug -
0 to 1 g. to space Multipurpose photo-
Provide data to facilitate - Pea seedling growth station graphic capability
understanding of the fundamental in orbit base OR TV or near real-
role gravity plays in all - Plant morphogenesis free time video	 .ape
aspects of physiology, bio- under weightlessness flight
chemistry, and behavior of both - Effect of weightless- with
lower and higher plants through- ness on gametogenesis frequent
out their life cyc'es of pteris gameto- docking
- Prove the capability of tong- phyles
term space systems to meet the - Rcle of auxion medi-
environmental needs and the ated reactions in
spacecraft supi.ort requirements developing wheat
for plant research in the opera.- seedlings during
tional environment weightlessness
- Role of gravitational
stress in land plaat
evolution
- Effect of gravita-
tional factors on
circadian rhythms in
plants
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TABLE 4-1 CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM (cant.)
CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPETITION REMARKS
- Maintenance and -repair
- Rendezvous and - Not
- Set up, monitor and terminate docking (permanent- available
experiment ly docked module)
- SpeAmen preparation for
- Exposure to chemi-
P' logistics return cals
,g - Maintenance and repair - Rendezvous and - Varied - Experiment envelope
o - Set up, monitor and terminate docking as required after not yet defined;
y experiment - Exposure to chemi- initial experiment selec-
- Specimen preparation for cals tions given are o V
logistic return typical; early ex-
perimentation is a
separate module
flown up and docked
to space station
with possible free -
flying mode and
periodic docking
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FUNCTIONAL PROGiL .M
ELEMENT GOALS EXPERIMENT LOCATION EQUIPMENT
METEOROLOGY SUP.".ATEId.IT - Ionospheric plasma - Remote - Own subsystems
experiment mode • Propulsion
- Conduct meteorology experiments 0 Stabilization
associated with the space sta- • Electrical
tion which, for operational • etc.
reasons, can only be done
remotely
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH - Medical/behavioral - Internal - Bicycle ergomet
- R&D support of medi- to space - Rotating litter
- Evaluate changes in human func- cal/behavioral station/ chair
tions and capabilities which experiments base - Body mass measu
may be induced by very long- went system
duration space flights - Lower body nega
tive pressure
device
- etc.
MAN-SYSTEK INTEGRATION - Space systems human - Internal - Space station/
factors to space base equipment/
- Provides quantitative and quali- - Extravehicular station/ hardware
tative information on the use o technology base
mn and his behavior in space - Maintenance and (some
flight and on the moon maintainability FVA)
- Behavior
LIFE SUPPORT AND PROTECTIVE - Water management - Internal - Space station/
SYSTEMS - Waste to space base equipment/
- Thermal control station/ hardware
- Provide a controlled and physio - Personal hygiene and base
logically acceptable environment sanitation
for flight crews during all - Atmosphere supply,
phases of flight control and oxygen
regeneration
- CO2 removal
- Trace contaminants
control
- Astronaut protective
systems
- Subsystems integra-
tion
- Closed life support
systems
- Sensors and instru-
mentation
- Food management
- Maintenance and
repair
t
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TABLE 4-1
	
CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM (cant.)
IPMENT CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPETITION REMARKS
systems - To be determined - Deployment/retriev- - Unknown - Subsatellite is a
sion al of vehicle; re- complete spacecraft
lization supplying vehicle
_rical with propellants
and other hazardous
materials
ergometer - Integrated medical and be- - None evident - Five functional
g litter havioral laboratory measuremen elements of IlMBLMS
system • Physiological
ss measure- • Behavioral
stem • Biochemical
ody nega- • Microbiological
essure • Data management
tation/ - Normal crew activities - EVA activities - As
uipment/ required
e
tation/ - Normal crew activities - None evident
uipmentf
e
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FUNCTIONAL PROGRAM
ELEWNT GOALS EXPERIMENT LOCATION EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURZG PROCESS DEVEIAPNJM - Form solid precision - Docked - No information - Ol
MODULE bodies by free, iner- mode •
tia and electrostatic (perma-
- Provide a facility in which the field casting nently OR
development and execution of - Form hollow precision periodic,
space manufacturing and mater bodies as above and
process projects can be conducted develop bubble cen-
tering processes
• Utilization of the buoyancy - Novel nucleation ccr_-
and thermal convection free trolling solidifica-
environment for processing of tion processes with
unique materials. completely free sus-
• Utilizatior of the molecular pended materials
forces of the materials during using supercooling.
liquid state for shaping and
configuration ,ontrol of
unique products.
CONTAMINATION MEASUREMENTS
- Internal - Advanced version
- Nc
to space of instruments
- Develop means of monitoring the station proposed for AAP
environment to determine when base
contamination is within
-
 External-
acceptable limits sensors
- Study the composition and distri
bution of e,jecta so that troubl
some components and unexpected
sources can be eliminated
EXPOSURE EXPERDWTS
- Acquire systematic
- Internal
- Nc
survey data covering to space
- Determine very long exposure station
• Effects of space environment times base
on the balk properties of
- Effects of size, mo-
- External
materials mentum and composi- sensors
• Effects of space environment tion distribution of
on the optical and thermal meteoroids on their
properties of surfaces penetration into
• Rates of micrometeoroid ero- specific materials
sion and possible entrapment
of meteoric material
• Effective methods of collect-
ing micrometeoroids and other
interplanetary material
EXTENDED SPACE STRUCTURE DEVELOP-
- Nc
MENT
- Develop and test large, light-
weight very extended structures
external to spacecraft, i.e.:
solar cell arras	 antennas	 etc
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TABLE 4- 1	 CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM (cont.)
CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPETITION REMARKS
- Observe, monitor - High voltage usage - No
• Control experiments from - Possible use of information
manufacturing development volatile, flammabl
laboratory or explosive
materials
- No information available - None evident - No
information
- No information available - None evident - No
information
- No :information available - None evident - No
information
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FUNCTIONAL PROGRAM
ELEMENT GOALS
F
EXPERIMENT LOCATION EQUIPMENT
LUID PHYSICS 33 MICROMAVITY -
- Investigate
e Free diffusion and thermal
conduction in gases
e Internal friction and surface
tension in liquids
e Critical point phenomena
MATERIAL PROCESSING IN SPACE - Melting of floating - Internal - Provisions for	 -
samples of various to space a High temperature
- Investigate the practical uses materials station/ heating and tem-
which eventually complete weigh - Solidification of base perature control
lessness attainable in free- supercooled liquid a High vacuum and
flying spacecraft will have in drops inert atmosphere
the development of material pro- - Floating zone refin- enclosure
cessing techniques involving ing of well under- a Heat rejection
high temperatures and/or transi- stood materials a Floating solid
tions between the liquid or gas - Crystal growth on and liquid
phase and the solid state seeds suspended in samples
liquid solutions of
vapor
COMPONENT TEST AND SENSOR -
CALIBRATI0
- Provide the flexibility needed
to accommodate experiments which
are only in the conceptual stage
at present
- Support activities responding to
the new technology needs which
will only became apparent as
actual development of the space
station proceeds
ADVANCED SPAC-CRAFT SYSTEM TESTS -
- Conduct qualification tests rf
advanced spacecraft systems
- Provide facility for
e Accommodation of satellites
and experiment modules,
e Artificial gravity system,
e An isotope B_•ayton-cycle power
supply, and
e A space shuttle
FbMff e
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TABLE 4-1 CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM (amt.)
IT
CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPEiiTION REMARKS
- No information available - Possibly high - No
temperatures informatinn
or - Set up and conduct experiment, - High voltages and - No
rature monitor results, maintain temperatures information
d tem- equipmer_t
- Possible use of
ontrol volatile, flammabl
and or explosive
sphere materials
ion
olid
- No information
- No information
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FUNCTIONAL PROGRAM
ELEMENT GOALS EXPERIMENT LOCATION EQUIPMENT
ULTRAVIOLET STELLAR ASTRONOMY - Ultraviolet photo- - Attached - (2) 6" ultraviolet - Se
SURVEY graphic survey mode cameras - Re
- Ultraviolet stellar (boom - (2) 16-mm cameras
- Conduct an ultraviolet photo- spectrometry mounted - Spectrograph with
graphic survey of the sky - Schmidt image con- stabi- all-reflective
- Obtain spectra in the ultra- verter spectrograph lized optics
violet regions from selected platfo
strong ultraviolet sources, and
the entire celestial sphere
- Provide survey data of selected
areas for detail investigation
by larger instruments to follow
- Develop an ultraviolet technolo-
gy base and determine man's
potential in support of space
astronomy
HIGH-ENERGY STELLAR ASTRONOMY - Large-area X-ray -
 Perma- - X-ray counters - Se
detection neatly - Gamma-ray detector ec
- Perform stellar X-ray and gamma- - Low-energy gamma-ray docked - Nuclear gamma-ray - Cr
ray astronomy studies frcm above detection (launc spectrometer
the Earth's atmosphere - Nuclear gamma-ray separate-
- Spark chamber de-
spectrometer ly) tection system
- High-energ,­ gamma-r • High-energy
astronomy spark gamma-ray and
chamber detection charged particle
system detector
• Electronics
9 Display console
SPACE PHYSICS AIRLOCK - UV airglow horizon
- Internal
- Multiple camera - As
photography (5063) to space having 8 lens- - Ix
- Obtain data on space environment - Gegenschein/zodiacal station filter-film trans- - Re
in near-Earth orbit light (5073) base (2 port assemblies - Rc
- Determine the presence of an in- - Micrometeorite col- airlocks
- 70-mm camera
duced atmosphere about a space lection (S14q)
- Computer for auto-
station and measure its - Coronograph cor.tami- matic node
temporal changes nation measurements
- Came.A-photometer
(T025) system
- Contaminatioi: mea-
- Coronograph
surements (T027)
- Photoelectric
- Environmental compo- photometer
sition (T030)
- Photographic photo
meter, sunshields
- Mass spectrometer
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TABLE 4-1	 CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM (cont.)
CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPETITION REMARKS
- Set up, operate and maintain
- Handling of film- - As - Similar instruments
- Retrieve/replace film processing chemi- required flown on Aerobees
cals
- Subsyste*z for tot
- Film retrieval. and FPE
replacement • Boom	 -trot
mechanism
0 Stabilized
platform
- Set up, monitor and maintain - Initial rendezvous - 14-day - Change emulsion
equipment as required and docking intervals packs every 14 days
- Change emulsion packs - Retrieval of emul-
sion packs ( if
required)
- Assemble equipment - Handling of film- - As
- Initiate and monitor experiment processing chemi- required
- Retrieve/replace film cals
- Routine maintenance
- Film retrieval and
replacement
57 6 58
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FUNCTIONAL PROGRAM
ELEMENT GOALS EXPERIMENT LOCATION
EQUIPMENT
EARTH RESOURCES - Sensor - C
and e
- Investigate the various types o analysis n
sensors and systems from space labora-
and evaluate their utility for tory
providing periodic data which attached
will enable the various respon- to OR
Bible government agencies to remote
conduct their Earth resources maneuver
tasks more efficiently ing sub-
ss ;;eltitffi
• Photograph Yarth's surface to - Metric photography - Attached Metric cameras S
a resolution .,nd loc,Ltion made t
accuracy capable of allowing (mr`nned) N
maps to be n4e to L. t
1:250,000 scale C
• Determine extent to which - Multispectral (6) Hasselblad 500 S
multispectral photograph corn photot--raphy EL cameras
be applied to Earth sciences
• Collect, simultaneously multi- - Wire-range imagery - Remote Cassegrainian N
band data (at least five) telescope
which will be used to map the Dichro.,.c beam
spatial distribution of re•• spli t ^:.r
flective and emissive radii . - DetYctors
tion f5:om the Earth.
• Determine how accurately the - Short wavelength - Attached (2) acc-LL­ktoly S
spectral. reflectance from spectrometer mode bore-sighted e
terrain fe.Ltures can be re- (manned) telescopes r
corded in space and to what
extent it is modified by
atmospheric effects
• Construct detailed vertical - Interferometer - Attached Interferometer R
temperature and water vapor spectrometer mode spectrometer m
profiles to measure 03 k;oncen- (auto- p
tration and to detect and mea- ma-.-ic)
sire minor atmospheric
constituents
• Determine atmospheric and - IR temperature - Attached Modified Ebert S
water vapor vertical profiles sounder mode grating speccro-
and measure cloud top or sur- (auto- meter
face temperatures and pursuant matic)
cloud cover
• Hap brightness, temperature o - Microwave imager - Attached Receiver, electron -
atmosphere and ground and sea mode ically scanned
temperature for potential (auto- antenna
applicLtions in sea, ice, mat.ic)
hydrology and geology
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TABLE 4-1 CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM (cont.)
CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPETITION REMARKS
- 01 gerve, assemble, change film, - Handling of film- - As
align equipment, maintain equip processing chemi- required
meat, analyze data, etc. cals
- Docking/undocking
of space tug (if
technique adopted)
- Set up and visually acquire
target start point
- Monitor experiment and assess
target conditions
Chance film
Same rLs for metric
No inform_,.tion
Set t1.p, crlitr..tc and monitor
experin ,art; V.LUtify site to be
recorded
Reco?Xlize, acquire with instrv.-
mer.c, arid describe meteorological
phenoma of interest
Set up, calibrate, and monitor
- Set up, initiate. and monitor
.L.
59 & 60
FOLDOIlZ^	 ^_.
FUNCTIONAL PROGRAM
ELEMENT GOALS EXPERIMENT LOCATION EQUIPMENT
IONOSPHERE PLASMA IN',/ESTIGATION - Plasma wake - Detached - Transmitter/re- -
- Harmonic wave mode ceiver with boom
- Investigate effects on thermos- transmission (subsatel mounted dipole -
pheric plasma of spacecraft lites) antenna -
traveling through ionosphere - Periodic - Oscilliscope, tape
- Study cyclotron harmonic wave docking recorder, magneco-
transmission which is an un- meter
explained resonance at plasma
harmonic frequencies
COSMIC 'RAY PHYSICS LABORATORY --- - Internal - Ionization spectra -
to space graph -
- Determine detailed properties station
of the high-ener^ cosmic-ray base
particles from 1010 to 1015
electron volts (ev)
- Use very high-energy particles
in space to perform controlled
laboratory experiments
FOLDOUT FRA14
^t
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TABLE 4-1	 CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT PROGRAM (cont.)
CREW SUPPORT SAFETY HAZARD REPETITION REMARKS
- Set up, check out, calibrate, Subsatellite dockin - As
moritor, routine maintenance or recovery required
- Maneuver (remotely)
- Erect antenna on space station
pe !EVA)
-o-
ro - Initial deployment and check-ou - EVA activity - As - EVA to remove
- Monitor, trouble-shoot and per- required module wall panel,
form maintenance allowing space
vacuum into bay,
to window on
detector housing
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5.0 INTERNAL TRAFFIC PATTERN ANALYSIS
	
5.1	 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this analysis was to examine the safety problems involved
with crew distribution, traffic flow, equipment arrangement, and escape
routing. Crew Safety Guidelines to alleviate these problems were developed.
In Phase I of the study, the 6-man Single Launch Space Station (SLSS) and
the Early Orbital Space Station (EOSS) were analyzed to identify hazards
and potential hazards inherent to traffic flow, crew distribution, equip-
ment arrangement, pressure suit location, and escape routes from a
"hazard" area to a "safe" area or emergency return vehicle. The Boeing
Crew Activity Sequencing Program (CASP) was used as the basis for the
analysis. A "typical day" from a 30-day CASP printout was selected for
the initial work. It was intended that later i.n the study CASP would be
modified to accommodate safety criteria generated by the study and that a
mission segment of 30 to 60 days would be examined for safety considera-
tionc. Before this point was reached, however, the study was redirected
into Phase II and realigned to more directly support the Phase B Futv..re
Space Station Definition (Reference No. 92).
In Phase II, the 12-man space station was analyzed on much the same basis,
with the exception of the factors of pressure suit location and the use
of emergency return vehicles. During the redirection it was mutually
agreed that pressure suits, at least as presently designed, offer little
interest as emergency devices and that for the study purposes it would be
assumed that emergency escape vehicles as such would not be considered.
Also, the analysis of a 30- to 60-day mission segment was deleted because
the detailed information on the 12-man station mission, configuration, and
experiment package, necessary for the analysis, mould not be available
during the Safety Study period.
No specific analysis was made of crew distribution and traffic problems
in a rotating station, such as the JAG-1 or future space base. However,
it is believed that the Crew Safety Guidelines developed are applicable
in general to rotating stations, except for the unknown area of the rela-
tive ease of crew movement in zero-gravity versus artificial-gravity
environments.
	
5.2	 APPROACH AND ASSUMPTIONS
In general, the approach taken was to identify and examine the "worst case"
situation. It was assumed that the "worst case" was that in which an
emergency occurred either in an area which was occupied at that time by
the maximum number of crew members or which involved the maximum travel
distance for escape. Therefore, the situations presented generally
represent extremes in crew distribution, and show the traffic patterns
which result from crew movement to a safe location. Each case is
- 63 -
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identified as to gross location of emergency, time of occurrence in a
"typical" day. and destination. For each case, the most difficult destina-
tion was chosen in order to establish an outside time parameter.
The term "emergency" was not defined in these cases, other than as some
condition which makes it necessary to retreat from normal crew distribu-
tion to another, and safe, location. It was assumed that the nature and
location of the emergency would be made known to all the crew and that all
crew members in the area of the emergency would not be incapacitated to the
point where they were unable to take whatever action is necessary; e.g.,
evacuate the area and/or don protective equipment.
In Phase I; for the SLSS and EOSS, it was assumed that the nature of the
emergency would be such as to require that the astronauts proceed to the
emergency re-entry vehicle (ERV). It was assumed further that pressure
suits would be donned either en route to the ERV or after arriving there.
The Apollo Block II suit was used as the baseline suit, in conjunction
with its Portable Life Support System (PISS). At that time in the study,
it was recognized that each crew member must use his own suit, with no
two suits interchangeable. Consequently, escape routes for a crew member
reflect the necessity of reaching his particular suit. Placement of suits
15 shown in Figures 5 -3 through 5 -6 and Figures 5-10 through 5-13. Particu-
lar suit location is based on astronaut time usage versus location during
working hours. For example, crew members 1, 4 and 5 spend a greater por-
tion of their productive hours on the top deck than do crew members 2, 3
and 6. Therefore, suits for 1, 4 and 5 are assumed to be on the top deck.
It was further assumed that the cabin atmosphere was adequate for suit
storage, that helmets were stored separately, but adjacent to the suits,
and that the PLSS units were charged to 900 psig prior to launch and were
rechargeable.
Specification times to don and check out suits and PLSS were:
a. Intravehicular suit---3 men together, from fully unsuited to fully
suited: 15 minutes (being met at the time of the study).
b. Extravehicular suit---1 man aided, from fully unsuited to fully
suited: 15 minutes (not being met at the time of the study).
c. PLSS: 30 minutes normal, with aid; and 15 minutes minimum, with aid.
The physical stature of present astronauts varies considerably, as shown
in Table 5-1 (Reference 25). It is assumed that future astronauts,
including scientists and technicians temporarily on-board space facilities,
such as the space base, will show at least as great, if not greater,
variations.
It was assumed that hatches and airlocks between self-sustaining compart-
ments or modules were normally closed or would be closed immediately upon
l
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recognition of an emergency. Size of hatches, as dictated by the pressure
suit arl PISS, were: with PISS---39i inches, and without PLSS---25 inches
(maxin-um shoulder breadth plus one inch).
5.3	 SINGLE LAUNCH SFACE STATION (SLSS) EVALUATION
The principal tool used in this evaluation was the Boeing-developed Crew
Activities Sequencing Program (CASP). This is a computer program by means
of which a space mission may be simulated, taking into account constraints
on the mission, such as crew skills, power requirements, target locations,
and many others (Reference No. 109). CASP provides a timeline printout
showing the activity performed by the station and individual crew members
on a minute-by-minute basis for periods of up to 30 days. At the time of
the study, however, CASP did not include safety considerations among the
parameters evaluated.
At the outset of the work it was decided to select a single "typical day"
for an initial review of safety considerations having to do with crew
activities and distribution. There being no known basis for selection of
one day in preference to another, the first mission day was arbitrarily
chosen. Since crew locations and movement were the primary items of
concern, the entire CASP printout was not needed, and, for convenience, a
very brief extract of the printout was prepared. This brief extract is
shown as Table 5-2, and is described in the fc'lowing paragraphs.
The column, Time/Station Activity, shows first the elapsed mission time
in days, hours and minutes. In the extract, only break-point times are
shown; that is, times at which there is some change in activity. Second,
s+ation activity is shown, with no entry indicating normal operation; TX
indicating transmission of data and S!S indicating a subsystem failure
which is firmly identified in the complete printout. A failure is shown
as occurring at 8:06, which is identified as a component in the electri-
cal power system (Ep 125), by noting that it was repaired by crew member
Number 2 from 11:27 through 13:05.
Crew members are identified only by numbers 1 through 6, with the activity
and location shown for each member. An alpha-numeric symbol, e.g., ATS 17,
under an activity indicates the performance of an experiment, which is
further identified in Table 5-3. The hazards associated with experiments
were not considered in this task, but were covered under another (see
Section 4.0 of this document). Since the Candidate Experiment Program on
which Section 4.0 is based was not available for the traffic pattern
analysis, the experiment program for the SLSS study was used. It is
described in detail in Reference No. 80. Other activities are self-
explanatory. CASP did not provide crew locations, so this information was
derived by reference to the SLSS configuration (Reference No. 81) and the
experiments being done, and is shown in the table by alpha-numeric
symbols. Figure 5-1 shows the locations on the SLSS configuration..
0
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TABLE 5-3
SLSS "TYPICAL DAY" EXPERIMENTS
EXPERIMENT
NUMBER	 TITLE
AA 8 Galaxie Characteristics---Part Sky
Survey X-Ray Spectrograph
AA 15 Solar High-Resolution Photographic,
Spectroheliograph and Spectrograph
AS 3 Weather Type
AS 19 Atmosphere Temperature Profile
AS 20 Atmosphere Density Profile
AS 23 Solar/Terrestrial Radiation
AS 24 Lwer Boundary Surface
ATS 11 Heat "ransfer
ATS 14 Sensor Behavior
ATS 17 Magnetic Shielding
ATS 18 Solar Pressure and Temperature
ATS 20 Material/ Environment
ATS 27 Counter Rotating Radar
B 3 Mutational Rates
B a Rat Development
B 10 Rat Healing Ability
B 11 Rat Gravity Readaptation
B 13 Surgery Methods
B 17 Botanical Laboratory
C/N 5 Spacecraft Antenna Pattern
G/N 8 High Frequency Propagation
C/N 9 Long-Range High Frequency
C/N 11 Atmosphere Scintillation and
Polarization
C/N 19 Tracking and Navigation
C/N 21 Interferometer
ER 13 Land Use Moisture -
ER 20 Gravity Gradient
ER 25 Surface Features
ER 33 Temperature Anomaly
ER 37 Water Mixing Near Glaciers
ER 41 Sea Temperature
ER 46 Fresh/Salt hater Interface
ER 48 Sea Surface Temperature
ER 49 Sea Surface Stress and Roughness
ER 50 Topography Under Oceans
ER 51 Detail Inspection
P 11 Subsatellite Operation #2
P 13 Radio Frequency Sounding
P 14 Daytime Sodium Cloud
10
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Figure 5-1:	 SLSS CREW LOCATIONS
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As previously stated, it was desired to analyze the "worst cases" of
crew distribution. They were identified in Table 5-2 as occurring at
0630 (Case 5-3), 1500 (Case 5-4), 1200 (Case 5-5) and 0458 (Case 5-6).
They are also shown in Figure 5 -2 in which horizontal bars are used to
show crew occupancy of various locations with the height of the bar
representing the number of crew members present. The shaded area of the
bars indicate crew-oriented activity, i.e., activity devoted to the health
and well-being of the crew such as sleeping, eating, recreation and the
like. Vertical lines through the figure show the above four cases.
It will be noted that there are some small discrepancies in both Table 5 -2
and Figure 5 -2 in that in some cases a crew member is shown at more than
one location in the same time block. These discrepancies hinge on the
fact that, at the time of the study, CASP took into account the total time
required to perform an activity but did not consider minor times for crew
movement within a general activity. Within the general activity of having
a meal, for example, the crew member can be expected to move back and
forth between the food preparation and dining areas. In the SLSS, the
distances and times involved are considered negligible and it was not
thought worthwhile to resolve the discrepancies. However, in future
stations, the distances and times may be significant and the existence
of this discrepancy should serve to call attention to them. For purposes
of the traffic pattern analysis described below, a crew location was
arbitrarily selected in those cases of discrepancy.
5.3.1	 TRAFFIC PATTERNS IN EMERGENCIES
Having established the crew locations in the 6-man SLSS during Phase I,
it was assumed that an emergency occurred. The nature of the emergency
was not defined, other than to specify that it required immediate evacua-
tion from the area of the emergency to another, and safe, location; that
crew members would then proceed to the ERV's; that pressure suits would
be required and would be donned, either en route to the ERV or after
arriving at the ERV; and that crew members would all be capable of per-
forming tasks or taking action as necessary.
5.3.1.1	 EMERGENCY IN OUTER MODULES---MAXIMUM CREW DISTRIBUTION IN
OUTER MODULES
(Timeline 06:30, Traffic Flow to Inner Module, Suits and
ERV)
At the time the emergency occurs, crew distribution is as follows
(Reference Figure 5-3):
Crew member 1 is in the Advanced Technology Lab---Outer module, upper
deck.
Crew members 2, 3 1 4 and 5 are sleeping---Outer module, lower deck.
Crew member 6 is at the subsystem command and monitor console---
Inner module, upper deck.
- 
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Audible and/or visual warning devices will announce the occurrence of an
emergency condition in the outer core. Emergency procedures dictate a
swift retreat to the inner module. The most expedient routes are shown
in Figure 5-3. Crew members 1, 4 and 5 must travel to the inner module
upper deck to reach their suits. Similarly, astronauts 2, 3 and 6 must
travel to the inner module lower deck to reach their suits. It should be
noted that astronauts 2, 3 1 4, and 5 must travel to the opposite side
of the outer compartment (although in opposite directions) to enter the
inner module in the shortest time. If the emergency in the outer module
is on the lower deck in this case, at least two of the crew would be
expected to be exposed to this emergency. Traffic flow through the inner/
outer module hatch on the lower deck is heavy, since four crew members
(2, 3, 4 and 5) must use that hatch, almost simultaneously. An advantage
of this flow is that these members can readily account for each other.
If the emergency warranted, the suits could be by-passed, and crew members
go directly to their respective ERV, where additional suits are stored.
5 . 3 .1 . 2	 EMERGENCY IN INNER MODULE---MAXIMUM CREW DISTRIBUTION IN
INNER MODULES
(Timeline 15 :00, Traffic Flow to Emergency Re-entry Vehicle)
At the time the emergency occurs, the crew distribution is an follows
(Reference Figure 5-4):
Crew members 1, 3 and 6 are in their staterooms---Outer module, lower
deck.
Crew members 2 and 5 are'in the camera module.
Crew member 4 is in the environmental subsystem area---Outer module,
lower deck.
Audible/visual warning devices would announce the occurrence of an emer-
gency in the inner module. If the emergency warranted, the crew would
proceed to their respective ERV, as shown in Figure 5-4, without suits.
Crew members 1 and 3 would proceed counterclockwise to the nearest upper
deck access, then to their respective ERV. Crew member 6 would follow a
similar route, but clockwise to his nearest upper deck access. Crew
member 4 would immediately leave the inner module through the lower deck
hatch and proceed to his ERV, in a clockwise direction, via the upper deck
access, or else he would have to travel an additional 180 degrees to gain
entry to his ERV, since the biolab blocks the deck. Crewmen 2 and 5 would
exit the camera module into the lower deck inner module and travel through
the inner/outer module hatch. They would split, with crewman 2 traveling
counterclockwise to the upper deck access. Crewman 5 would travel clock-
wise to the upper deck access. Once they had achieved the upper deck,
each would go to his respective ERV. It should be noted that crewmen 2
and 5 have the option to remain in the camera module. This will be based
on various information from the emergency detection system, and intercom
data from other crew members. A similar situation would occur if a crewman 	 0
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were in the solar or stellar telescope modules at the time of outer module
emergency, since the access hatches to these modules are in the outer
module. For this reason, a separate case for a crewman in the telescope
modules was not used.
	
5.3.1.3	 EMERGENCY IN OUTER MODULE---TYPICAL CREW DISTRIBUTION
(Timeline 12:00, Traffic Flow to Suits)
The emergency will be announced by audiovisual devices. At that time,
crew distribution is as follows (Reference Figure 5-5):
Crew members 1, 3 and 6 are in their staterooms---Outer module,
lower deck.
Crew member 2 is performing maintenance functions---Inner module,
lower deck.
Crew member 4 is having his meal---Outer module, lower deck.
Crew member 5 is in the camera module.
The most direct route to suits is shown in Figure 5-5. Crewmen 1 and 3
would proceed in a counterclockwise direction to the inner outer module
hatch. Crewman 1 must then travel to the upper deck to get to sis suit.
Crewman 6 would proceed in a clockwise direction from his stateroom to the
inner/outer module hatch. His suit is directly inside. Crewman 2 can
step directly to his suit from his initial position. Crewman 4 must
travel through the inner/outer module hatch, and then to the upper deck to
reach his suit. Crewman 5 must enter the inner module through the camera
module hatch, then through the accessway to the upper deck to reach his
suit. Should the emergency warrant a direct route to ERV's, the above
would change only in that the crewmen 2, 3 and 6 would travel to the upper
deck and to their ERV. Whether they would enter the ERV suited or unsuited
is dependent on time and the nature of the emergency. Either choice could
be accommodated.
	
5.3.1.4	 EMERGENCY IN OUTER MODULE---DURING EVA
(Timeline 04:58, Traffic Flow to Inner Module and Suits)
Audio/visual warnings will announce that there is an emergency. At that
time, the crew distribution is as follows (Reference Figure 5-6):
Crew member 1 is in the EVA airlock.
Crew members 2, 4 and 5 are in their quarters---Lower deck, outer
module.
Crew member 3 is in the exercise/hygiene area---Lower deck, outer
module.
CCrew member 6 is EVA.
- 81 -
W-113070 -6
Figure 5-6 shows the most direct route to suits. Astronauts 2 and 3 will
travel counterclockwise to the inner module lower deck to reach their
suits. Crew members 4 and 5 will travel clockwise to the inner/outer
module hatch. Once through it, 4 and 5 must travel to the upper deck to
reach their suits. Crew members 1 and 6 have several options to consider,
each of which will depend on status information from the emergency detec-
tion system and crew via the intercom system. They could:
a. Remain where they are until emergency is over.
b. Re.nain in airlock until considered safe enough foi them to assess
%amage and/or make repairs.
c. Travel through the airlock and inner/outer module hatch to the inner
module.
d. Travel EVA to Emergency Return Vehicles.
NOTE: Timeline 04:58 for this case is taken from the third day of a
30-day computer timeline. It is superimposed into the typical day
schedule shown in Table 5 -2.
5.3. 2	 SLSS TRAFFIC DENSITY
A summation of occurrences for area-to-area travel was constructed, using
the "Typical Day" timeline as a base (Table 5-2). An arbitrary figure of
eight occurrences per day is used as the division between heavy flow and
light flow. Heavy flow routes are as follows:
a. Stateroom tc/from Personal Hygiene and Exercise (8 occurrences).
b. Meal Preparation to/from Meal Consumption (36 occurrences).
c. Meal Consumption to Personal Hygiene and Exercise (8 occurrences).
d. Photo Lab to/from Camera Module (11 occurrences).
e. Lower Deck, Inner Module to/from Camera Module (12 occurrences).
f. Bio Work Center to/from Bio Lab (8 occurrences).
It is interesting to note that (a) through (c) are crew-oriented functions,
and (d) through (f) are experiment-oriented functions. The number of
occurrences is greater for crew oriented functions. This is in consonance
with the total ratio for crew versus experiment-oriented functions (2:1).
The gross statement can be made that the lower deck is busier than the
upper deck, and the outer module is busier than. the inner module. More
specifically the meal preparation/meal consumption/personal hygiene and
exercise areas (which are adjacent to each other) show the highest traffic
flow.	 0
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A summation of hatch/airlock/accessway utilization was constructed, using
the timeline (Table 5-2). The summation is shown in Figure 5-7. There
are three routes which carry heavy flow: the lower deck inner module-to-
camera module hatch, the upper/lower inner modules accessway, and the upper
deck inner module/experiment deck airlock. Suit wear, pressure-tight Seal
wear, accessway padding, and obstacles or impediments to traffic are
matters of concern.
5.3.3	 ACCESS ROUTES TO EMERGENCY RETURN VEHICLES (ERV'S)
Shirtsleeve access to ERV's is unobstructed and uncomplicated in the SLSS,
with the exception of the configuration and placement of the Bio Lab. Its
location blocks the upper deck, outer module. This in itself is of little
consequence, because an accessway and airlock are adjacent to the lab.
This precludes a crew member from becoming trapped in the event of an
emergency. However, considering that unique space suits make it compulsory
for a crewman to reach his particular suit, having to travel an additional
distance to reach safety could jeopardize that crew member.
Suited access (with PLSS) is restricted to the inner and outer modules
lower deck because the inner/outer modules hatch and the EVA airlock hatch
are the only accessways that will accommodate a fully suited crew member.
The remaining accessways have a 32-inch diameter, and the minimum diameter
to allow access for a suited crew member is 3" inches. Increasing the
minimum hatch size would be necessary to allow a suited crew member com-
plete access to all parts of the station, and to the ERV's.
Manning vehicles are not considered. in emergency routing, because the
integral ERV's are specifically made for this purpose; hence, they are the
primary escape vehicle. However, the manning vehicles could be used for
emergency escape, if necessary.
5.3.4	 SUIT LOCATION
Suit locations are shown in the four emergency escape cases (Figures 5-3
through 5-6). It is desirable to have one suit per man in every isolatable
compartment. Otherwise, an emergency in the entrance to the compartment
could maroon a crew member. The SLSS presently contains three such com-
partments: the camera module and two telescope modules.
The timeline (Table 5-2) shows that the solar and stellar telescope modules
are frequented by only one crew member--45. The camera module is fre-
quented by only two crew members---#2 and #5. Storing one suit for crew
member 5 in each of the modules, plus one for crew member 2 in the camera
module, would eliminate the problem of marooning a crew member.
An astronaut may retreat to his ERV suited or unsuited. His choice is
dependent on the nature of the emergency and the amount of time available.
IL	 If he goes unsuited, there is a suit stored in the ERV for him. If he
goes suited he can jettison his extra suit at any convenient time.
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5.4	 EARLY ORBITAL SPACE STATION (EOSS) EVALUATION
The experiment program of EOSS is identical with that of SLSS, although the
configuration is different (Reference No. 22). Because of configuration
differences, crew locations on EOSS had to be redetermined. It was assumed
that the timeline would also be identical and the same "typical day' could
be used for the EOSS as was used for SLSS.
The CASP printout extract used on SLSS was modified to fit the EOSS con-
figuration, to give an EOSS timeline (Table 5-4). This timeline was
simplified to show only crew locations in the EOSS and elapsed mission
time, using t're SLSS times. As before, crew locations are shown by alpha-
numeric symbols and were determined by references to the EOSS configura-
tion, together with the experiment being performed. Figure 5-8 shows the
crew locations on the EOSS configuration.
As in the SLSS, the EOSS timeline was used to identify the cases of crew
distribution desired for further analysis. The cases selected are at
0001 (Case 5-10), 1526 (Case 5-11), 1141 (Case 5-12), and 0458 (Case 5-13).
Crew distributions are also shown graphically in Figure 5-9, in which
numbers of crew members in various locations are given versus elapsed
mission time. The four cases selected for further evaluation are shown by
vertical lines through the figure. The same discrepancy of a crew member
being shown in some cases at more than one location in a time block occurs
here for the same reasons as with the SLSS.
5.4.1	 TRAFFIC PATTERNS IN EMERGENCIES
As with the SLSS, the assumption was made that an emergency occurred at
the time selected for analysis. The emergency was not defined, other than
that it required evacuation to another location, the donning of pressure
suits, and that the astronauts were capable of taking further necessary
action.
5.4.1.1
	 EMERGENCY IN CENTER MODULE---MAXIMUM DISTRIBUTION IN CENTER
MODULE
(Timeline 00:01, Traffic Flow to ERV's)
At the time the emergency occurs, crew distribution is as follows (Reference
Figure 5-10):
Crew member 1 is in the Environmental Control/Communication area---
Deck 1.
Crew members 2, 3, 4 and 5 are in their quarters---Deck 2.
Crew member 6 is in the Waste Managemen+Ju-giere area---Deck 1.
L
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TABLE 5-4:	 EOSS "TYPICAL DAY" TIMELINE
Time
Crew Mwbsr and Location
1 2 3 4 5 6
0	 01 18 2A 2A 2B 26 IA,	 18
31 IC
1	 11 2A
2	 01 IA
11 16
31 4C
48 4D
3	 00 4D
01 28
09
17 4D
30
34 4D
51 4D
4	 01 IC
08 4C
15
25 IC
31
36
41 IA 4D
53 4D
5	 01
10 3A
11 4B,D,B
17
23 4C
40 4C
41 2A
57 3A,4c
6	 14
17 4B,3A,4B
27 4C
38
44 4C
7	 01 4D
13
28
30 4B,3A,4B
31 IA IA
41
57 4C
8	 00 2A
06
12
31 1C 1C
37 2B
9	 47 lA IB 1A,16 IA
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TABLE 5-4:	 (continued)
c
Time
Crew Member and location
1 2 3 4 5 6
10	 11 2A 26
31 lA
11	 27 MDAM,18
31 1C
41 4B,E,4B
56 48,4A,48
12	 01 4A
06 4A
11 38
21 48,A,4B
55 4A
56 4A
58
13	 05
11' IA
13 4A
15
18 4B,4A,4B
25 48,4A,48
40
41 28 1C
43 1C
14	 11 1C IC
21 48,4A,46
23 4A
26 4A
28 4B,4A,4B
36
41 4A
43
46 4A
48 48,E,48
51 2A 18
54 48
56 48,A
15	 03 4A
o6 4A
21
23
26 A,4B
28 411,4A,48
33 3A
36 4A
51
53
54 4B,4A,4B
16	 01 38
10 2A
19 26
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TABLE 5-4: (continwd)
Time
Craw MwNbar and Location
1 2 3 4 5 6
17	 00
21 3C,B10
41 IA lA
18	 21
41 1C 1C
19	 21 2A 38 B10 311 211
35
51
20	 01 1C iC
25
41 36 3C,610
5 1 36 2A 311 31122	 01 B10
21 2A IC 1C 2B
42
23	 O1 IA B10 lA
21 IC 1C28
31 B10
33
51 26
0
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Audible and/or visual warning devices will announce an emergency in the
center module. The crew will retreat from the center module to their
respective ERV's. Crew members 1, 4, and 5 will exit their respective
areas and travel to the Multiple DockinAirlock Module (MDAM) and ERV via
the center module access tunnel, center forward module hatch, and ERV
hatch. Crew members 2, 3 and 6 will exit their respective areas and
travel to the aft module and ERV via the center module access tunnel,
center/aft module hatch, EVA airlock, and ERV hatch.
In the event that the emergency is not severe enough to utilize the ERV's,
numerous combinations of crew members suited-up to investigate damage,
isolated in ERV's arid/c:r isolated in modules could be used until the
emergency is corrected.
5.4.1.2	 EMERGENCY IN AFT MODULE---MAXIMUM CREW DISTRIBUTION IN AFT
MODULE
(Timeline 15:26, Traffic Flow to ERV's)
At the time the emergency occurs, crew distribution is as follows (Reference
Figure 5-11):
Crew members 1, 3 and 6 are in their quarters---Deck 2.
Crew member 2 is in the Earth Resources area---neck 4.
Crew member 4 is in the Environmental Control/Communications area---
Deck 1.
Crew member 5 is in the astronomy module.
An audible and/or visual warning device will announce an emergency in the
aft module. Crew members 1 and 4 will exit their respective areas and
travel to their ERV via the center module tunnel, forward/center module
hatch, and ERV hatch. Crew members 3 and 6 will travel to their ERV via
the center module tunnel, center/aft module hatch, EVA airlock, and ERV
hatch. Crew member 5 will travel to his ERV via the aft/astronomy module
hatch, center/aft module hatch, EVA airlock, and ERV hatch. Crew member 5
will travel to his FXV via the aft/astronomy module hatch, center/aft
module hatch, center module tunnel, center/forr+ard module hatch, and ERV
hatch. Crew member 2 will step into the EVA airlock and then to his ERV.
The above routes are the most direct. However, crew members 3, 6, and 5
must expose themselves to conditions in the emergency area to reach their
ERV's. Assuming ',ae emergency is such that a suit is required to pass
through the area, crew member 5 would be stranded until the emergency is
over and the aft module is habitable. Crew members 3 and 6 could be aided
as follows:
S
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a. Crew members 1 and 4 could suit up after 3 and 6 had retreated to the
MDAM and let 3 and 6 use the forward ERV, while they go to the aft
ERV to share it with crew member 2.
b. Crew members 3 and 6 could retreat to the MDAM while suited crew
members 1 and/or 4 and/or 2 bring them suits. Once crew members 3
and 6 are suited, they can follow their normal route to their ERV, or
go EVA to their ERV if the situation warrants.
5.4.1.3
	
EMERGENCY IN FORWARD MODULE---MAXIMUM CREW DISTRIBUTION IN
FORWARD MODULE (MDAM)
(Tim-2line 11:41, Traffic Flow to ERV's)
At the time the emergency occurs, crew distribution is as follows (Refer-
ence Figure 5-12):
Crew members 1, 3 and 6 are in their quarters---Deck 2.
Crew member 2 is in the Multiple Docking Airlock Module (MDAM).
Crew member 4 is having his meal---Deck 1.
Crew member 5 is in the Earth Sensors module.
An audible and/or visual warning device will announce an emergency in the
forward module. Crew members 1 and 4 will exit their respective areas and
go to their ERV's via the center module tunnel, center/forward module
hatch, and ERV hatch. Crew members 3 and 6 will exit their respective
areas and go to their ERV's via the center module tunnel, center/aft
module hatch, EVA airlock, and ERV hatch. Crew member 2 will go to his
ERV via the center/forward module hatch, center module tunnel, center/aft
module hatch, EVA airlock, and ERV hatch. Crew member 5 will go to his
ERV via the Earth sensors/aft module hatch, center/aft module hatch,
center module tunnel, center/forward module hatch, and ERV hatch.
Although those routes shown in Figure 5 -12 are the most direct, crew
members 1, 4 and 5 are subjected to conditions in the emergency compartment
to reach their ERV. They may be aided in the following manners:
a. They may retreat to the aft module while crew member 2 and/or 3 and/or
6 brings suits to them, and then proceed to their ERV in an intra-
vehicular or extravehicular mode, depending on the emergency.
b. They could use the aft ERV and let suited crew members 2, 3 and 6
travel to and use the forward ERV, if the situation warrants.
C
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5.4.1.4
	 EMERGENCY IN THE CENTER MODULE---DURING EVA
(Timeline 04:58, Traffic Routes to ERV's)
At the time the emergency occurs, crew distribution is as follows (Refer-
ence Figure 5-13):
Crew member 1 is in the aft EVA airlock.
Crew members 2, 4 and 5 are in their quarters---Deck 2.
Crew member 3 is in the waste management/hygiene area---Deck 1.
Crew member 6 is EVA.
An audible and/or visual warning device will announce that there is an
emergency in the center module. Crew members 2 and 3 will exit their
respective locations and proceed to the aft ERV via the center module
tunnel, center/aft module hatch, EVA airlock hatch, and ERV hatch. Crew
members 4 and 5 will exit their respective quarters and proceed to the
forward. ERV via the center module tunnel, center/forward module hatch,
and ERV hatch. Crew members 1 and 6 have several alternatives as follows:
a. They could proceed to their respective ERV's, i.e., #6 returns to the
EVA airlock and then goes inside his ERV; #1 travels the length of
the station• via the hatches and tunnel, to the forward ERV.
b. Sane as above, except #1 goes EVA to the forward ERV, via the station
hull and
1) the ERV external hatch
2) the MDAM airlock and the ERV internal hatch
3) rides the ERV externally away from the station until such time as
conditions will allow him to enter
c. #1 and #6 move into the aft module (Deck 4) and perform the functions
necessary to control the emergency and/or execute repair/safety func-
tions in the center module.
5.4.2	 EOSS TRAFFIC DENSITY
A summation of occurrences for area-to-area travel was constructed, using
the "Typical Lay" timeline as a base (Table 5-4). An arbitrary figure of
five occurrences per day is used as the division between heavy flow versus
light flow. Heavy flow routes are as follows:
a. Life support system, waste management, and hygiene area to/from crew
quarters (15 occurrences).
b. Life support system, waste management, and hygiene area to/from galley
and wardroom area (10 occurrences).
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c. Galley and wardroom area to/from crew quarters (6 occurrences).
c?. Physical sciences lab to/from photo lab (5 occurrences).
e. Earth resources controls to/from photo lab (28 occurrences).
Routes (a) through (c) are crew-oriented functions, and (d) and (e) are
experiment-oriented functions. Although the number of occurrences are
almost equal (31-33), it is noteworthy that (a) through (c) are predominantly
between deck-to-deck areas and (d) and (e) are predominantly between adjacent
areas on the sane_ deck.
In general it can be stated that Decks 1 and 2 account for a larger portion
of the traffic flow than the rest of the station. Specifically, the crew
quarters, hygiene and waste management, and galley and wardroom areas show
the greatest concentration.
A summation of hatch/airlock/accessway utilization was constructed, using
the timeline (Table 5-4). It is shown in Figure 5-14. There are three
routes which show heavy flow. They are:
a. Deck 1 (Galley, waste management, C & C) and
Deck 2 (Crew quarters)---42 occurrences.
b. Deck 2 (Crew quarters) and
Deck 3 (Biomedical lab, physical sciences)---32 occurrences.
c. Deck 3 (Biomedical lab, physical sciences) and
Deck 4 (Earth resources, photo)---22 occurrences
The center module tunnel accounts for 96 of the 17 otal occurrences
that take place during the "Typical Day."
5.4.3	 ACCESS ROUTES TO EMERGENCY RETUM. VEHICLES (ERV'S)
Shirtsleeve and suited (with PISS) access is sufficient to allow a crew
member to reach any compartment in the station (43-inch diameter hatches).
The routes seem to be straight-forward, though quite congested. Figures
5-10 through 5-13 show that the center module tunnel is the only traffic
route between the forward (MDAM) and aft (Deck 4) modules. Consequently,
to get to the ERV's, crew members must use this tunnel, often opposing
each others progress. Minimum use of the tunnel in the cases represented
is by 5 of the 6 crew members (Figures 5-10 and 5-13). The tunnel in some
parts is hexagonal in cross section and measures 56 inches flat-to-flat.
A powered dolly is the normal mode of transportation through the center
module tunnel. It is guided by two rails, which also serve as hand rails
if the dolly is not used. It is assumed that the dolly would not be used
in an emergency case, because of its low speed and two-passenger capacity.
Therefore, a hand-over-hand method, using the guide rails, would be used
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by the crew. Consider the case shown by Figure 5 -12. Crew member 2 must
travel from the forward module (MDAM) to the aft ERV. In doing so, he must
first maneuver around 1 and 4 who are traveling in the opposite direction
to him, and then maneuver past 5, also traveling in the opposite direction,
before he can get through the tunnel. Crew member 5 is in the identical
situation. The position of the dolly at the time the emergency takes place
would also have an effect on the congestion in the tunnel.
5.4.4	 SUIT LOCATIOY1
Suit locations are shown in the four emergency cases (Figures 5-10 through
5-13). It is desirable to have one suit per crew member in each isolatable
compartment. Otherwise, an emergency could maroon a crew member. The pro-
posed EOSS station configuration would easily allow a crew member(s) to be
isolated from his suit by an emergency in the center module. This condi-
tion can be alleviated by reversing the suit locations for either the
ERV's or the forward and aft modules. This would allow access to one suit
per man in the forward and aft modules for the entire crew. However, it
would complicate the procedures for suit/ERV routes. Even then, there are
four areas where no suits are available. These are: the center module,
the astronomy module, the Earth sensors module, and the Bio Lab. The time-
line shows that crew member 5 is the only man entering the Bio Lab. Crew
members 2 and 5 both use the Earth sensors module. Crew member 2 is the
o,.ty man to use the MDAM. All crew members use the center module. Since
the crew in the center module has access to both the forward and aft
-	 modules, isolation is not as severe a problem as it is for the others
mentioned. A suit for each crew member using the remaining compartments
would be required to remove that hazard.
5 . 5	 NASA PHASE B 'TWELVE-MAN SPACE STATION EVALUATION
The Space Station Program Definition Study (Phase B) Statement of Work
(Reference No. 92) provides gross concepts for the 12-Man Space Station
desired. W-l= hin those conceptual parameters, a gross configuration was
prepared for use as an analysis tool. Further explanation of the configura-
tion is given in Section 2.0 of this document. For the purposes of this
analysis, crew locations in th's configuration were specified using deck
ni,mbers 1 through 5, with a letter arbitrarily assigned to areas on each
deck, e.g., 1B, 5D, etc. These locations are shown on Figure 5-15.
The CASP program used for the SLSS and EOSS had assumed a six-man crew,
primarily, but with some evaluation of a nine-man crew as well. In work
done prior to the Safety Study, it he.d been determined that it was not
possible to complete the experiment program with either six- or nine-man
crews, for the reason, among others, that those crew sizes were +	 small.
A CASP program using a twelve-man crew had been prepared, also pr-,Dr to
the Safety Study which did permit completion of the experiment piogrr.m, at
least from tht crew size standpoint.
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The available twelve-man CASP printout was used for this portion of the
traffic pattern analysis. An extract (Table 5-5) was prepared in the same
manner as for the SIBS; namely, only break-point times were showr., with
crew locations at those times being determined by comparison of the experi-
ment performed with the configuration layout. Because crew locations and
traffic patterns are the only items of concern, equipment failures and the
actual experiments performed were not extracted. As with the SLSS and
EOSS, there is some uncertainty as to crew locations and the same dis-
crepancies exist of crew members being shown at more than one location
during a -time block. The times selected for further analysis were taken
directly from gable 5-5, with an arbitrary determination of precise crew
location where there was uncertainty. There times are: 2001 (Case 5-16),
0111 (Case 5-17), 1141 (Case 5-18) and 0001 (Case 5-19).
5.5.1	 TRAFFIC PATTERNS IN EMERGENIIES
For each case shown it was assumed that an emergency of some sort . had
occurred and that all crew members had been advised of its nature and
location. The emergency was not defined, other than to specify that it
required evacuation of the compartment or module in which the emergency
occurred, that evacuation to an adjacent compartment was sufficient, and
that crew members would be capable of taking the necessary action. As
previously stated, pressure suits and/or ERV's were not considered as
emergency measures.
5.5.1.1	 EMERGENCY IN OUTER MODULE, DECK 4---MAXIMUM CREW DISTRIBU-
TION IN OUTER MODULE
(Timeline 20:01 hours, Traffic Flow to Inner Module,
Deck 4)
At the time the emergency occurs, crew distribution is as follows (Refer-
ence Figure 5-16):
Crew member 1 is resting in his stateroom---Deck 4.
Crew members 2 and 5 are in the Clinical Lab---Deck 4.
Crew members 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, '_0, 11 and 12 are in the Galley---Deck 4.
Crew member 6 is in the Waste Management/Personal Hygiene area---
Deck 4.
Audible and/or visual warning devices will announce the presence of an
emergency in the outer module, Deck 4. The immediate course of action is
to evacuate the area. The inner module is the most logical refuge. Crew
members 1 and 6 would. exit their respective locations and travel to the
closest inner/outer module hatch to safety. Crew members 2 and 5 would
exit the clinical lab and move through the inner/outer module hatch closest
to them. Crew members 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 1 10, 11 and 12 would travel from their
positions in the galley to the closest inner/outer module hatch and to
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safety. At that time, all crew members have the option of remaining in
the inner module, Deck 4, or retreating to other locations, as the condi-
tion warrants. It is apparent that the entire crew could conceivably be
lost, if the emergency were of a sufficient magnitude. It would seem
advisable to schedule crew members such that they could not all be in the
same compartment at once.
5.5.1.2	 EMERGENCY IN INNER MODULE, DECK 5---MAXIMUM CF.';W DISTRIBU-
TION IN INNER MODULE
(Timeline 01:11 Hours ) Traffic Flow to Outer Module, Deck 5)
An audible/visual device will announce that an emergency exists in the
•	 inner module, Deck 5. At that time, crew distribution is as follows
(Reference Figure 5-17):
Crew members 1 and 10 are in Data Management area---Deck 5.
Crew members 2, 3, and 5 are in their quarters---Deck 4.
Crew members 9 and 11 are in their quarters---Deck 5.
Crew members 4 and 7 are in the Wardroom---Deck 5.
Crew member 6 is at the Command and Control Console---Deck 4.
Crew member 8 is in the Water Management area---Deck 3.
Crew member 12 is in the ECS #1 area---Deck 3.
Crew members 1 and 10 will react by immediately retreating from the
emergency area, i.e., from the Inner module, Deck 5, to the outer module,
Deck 5. The other grew members were assumed to be not immediately affected
by the emergency, due to the isolation concept of the structure.
5.5.1.3
	
EMERGENCY IN INNER MODULE, DECK 3---RANDOM CREW DISTRIBU-
TION
(Timeline 11:41 Hours, Traffic Flow to Outer Module, Deck 3)
The audible/visual device will announce that there is an emergency in the
inner module, Deck 3. At that time, crew distribution is as follows
(Reference Figure 5-18):
Crew members 1, 3, and 6 are in their staterooms---Deck 4.
Crew members 8, 10, and 12 are in their staterooms---Deck 5.
Crew member 2 is in the ECS #1 area---Deck 3.
Crew members 4, 7, and 9 are in the galley---Deck 4.
^i
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Crew member 5 is in the Earth Resources area---Deck 1.
Crew member 11 is in "he Personal Hygiene area---Deck 5.
Crew member 2 will exit the inner module, Deck 3, immediately to the outer
module, Deck 3. The remaining crew members were assumed not to be immedi-
ately affected, due to the isolating nature of the structure.
5.5.1.4	 EMERGENCY IN OUTER MODULE, DECK 5 --- RANDON CREW DISTRIBU-
TION
(Timeline 00:01 Hours, Traffic Flow to Inner Module,
Deck 5)
An audible/visual device will announce that there is an emergency in the
outer module, Deck 5. At that time, crew distribution is as follows
(Reference Figure 5-19):
Crew members 1 and 6 are at the Command and Control Console---Deck 4.
Crew members 2, 3, and 5 are in their quarters---Deck 4.
Crew member 9 is in his quarters---Deck 5.
Crew members 4, 7 and 11 are in the Wardroom---Deck 5.
Crew member 8 is in the Personal Hygiene area---Deck 5.
Crew member 10 is in the Data Management area---Deck 5.
Crew member 12 is in the Water Management area---Deck 3.
Upon recognition of the emergency, crew members 4, 7 and 11 will exit the
wardroom and go directly to the inner module, Deck 5, through the inner/
outer module hatch. Crew member 8 will exit the personal hygiene area,
travel through the wardroom and enter the inner module through the inner/
outer module hatch. Crew member 9 will exit his stateroom and enter the
inner module via the inner/outer module hatch closest to him. The other
crew members were assumed not to be immediately affected by the emergency,
due to the isolation concept of the structure.
5.5. 2	 PASSAGEWAY UTILIZATION
Figure 5-20 is a schematic of the 12-man space station representing the
relationship between compartments, hatches, airlocks, and docking perts
and their amount of usage during a "typical day." The two heaviest paths
of traffic are from Deck 4 to Deck 5 through the inner module, and between
the galley (Deck 4) and the wardroom (Deck 5). This trend is generally in
consonance with the previous findings discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4
of this analysis. The agreement is primarily that: crew-oriented traffic
outweighs the traffic necessary for experiment execution. Figure 5-21	 10
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reinforces this observation. The decks which contain living facilities
(Decks 4 and 5) have a higher concentration of crew time expended than any
other decks on the station.
it should be recognized that the crew are considered to spend their spare
time in their quarters, the wardroom, or the galley, depending on their
particular schedules.
5.5.3	 CREW OCCUPANCY
Figure 5-21 depicts the distribution of crew time during the "typical day,"
with the locations defined by the timeline (Table 5-5). It is evident
that the major portion of time is spent in the outer modules on Decks 4
and 5, which are primarily eating, sleeping, and personal care areas.
Decks 1 and 5 have more surfaca area exposed to space than any of the
remaining three. The outer modules have such exposed surface area, whereas
the inner modules do not, with the exception of those on Decks 1 and 5.
Therefore, it would seem that the inner m,)dules of Decks 2, 3 and 4 would
be the safest refuge from external hazards. Similarly, it would seem
advantageous to configure the station in such a manner that the high
density areas would be located within that envelope. This method would be
consistent with the ",storm cellar" approach, which is concerned with
retreat and protection from external hazards, i.e., meteoroid impact,
radiation, and docking maneuvers.
5.5.+	 AREA.-TO-AREA TRAFFIC DEFINITION
Figure 5 -22 shows the minimum area-to-area crew movement required to
p ,erform those functions schedules by the timeline. Each deck is divided
into designated areas. The number of occurrences of movement between
adjacent areas is shown for a 24-hour typical day period. The areas of
maximum movement are Decks 4 and 5. The paths of maximum movement are
between the wardroom and the inner module on Deck 5; between the inner
modules of Decks 4 and 5; and between the galley and the inner module on
Deck 4. In view of the magnitude of traffic between the gall.ey and the
wardroom, it would seem reasonable to either locate them near to each
other on the same deck, or make provisions in consideration of the heavy
traffic flow, i.e., larger hatches, designate "normally open" hatches,
relocation of equipment if necessary, etc.
5.6	 ANCILLARY CONSIDERATIONS
The traffic pattern analysis was directed primarily at crew distributions
and traffic patterns in an emergency. Some additional considerations were
examined briefly, as described in the following subsections.
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5.6.1	 DEGRADATION OF SAFETY DUE TO TRAFFIC FLOW
Some degradation in safety due to traffic flow may be expected since
traffic flow in or around work in progress will either distract attention
from the work, reduce the accuracy, or both.
5.6.1.1
	 SINGLE UUNCH SPACE STATION
The "Typical Day" timeline (Table 5 -2) shows that crew members 2 and 5
work in essentially the same areas from 13:30 to 20:41. Their effort is
toward related work, but different experiments are involved for each.
Therefore, it is possible that some distraction may occur due to their
close proximity.
5.6.1.2	 EARLY ORBITAL SPACE STATION
The "Typical Day" timeline (Table 5-3) shows that crew members 2 and 5
work in close proximity on Deck 4 from 13:18 to 15:33. There is also a
period from 20:41 to 22 :21 when as many as four crew members are in the
Physical Science Lab (3B). It is reasonable to expect some distractic-i
under these conditions; however, this study will not attempt to define the
magnitude.
5.6.1.3	 NASA PHASE B TWELVE-MAN SPACE STATION
The "Typical Day" timeline (Table 5-4) shows that crew members 3, 5 and 9
have scheduled tasks which overlap from 17:21 to 17:44 in the Earth
Resources experiment area (lA). Each is performing a different experiment,
and it is possible that some distraction may result.
No other potentially disrupting traffic is obvious for the cases above,
but this is based on the assumption that all crew members will stay in
designated locations and not wander about the station during unscheduled
or free time,
5.6.2	 DISTANCE TO SAFETY.
The present data on zero-gravity movement with respect to time is sparse
and not directly applicable to the configurations analyzed. Therefore, it
is advantageous to use another parameter with which to ,judge astronaut
exposure, based on distance from safe quarters in the event of an emergency.
Distance is applicable to the configurations and is easily obtained. Table
5-6 displays the maximum distance traveled by a crewman to reach a safe
compartment in each of the cases studied.
The distance to a safe compartment is generally less for the Early Orbital
Space Station than for the Single Launch Space Station configuration.
There is a fallacy in taking this reasoning verbatim. The Early Orbital
Space Station distances to safe compartments and suits will remain the same
unless major design changes are made, i.e., new pressure-tight compart-
mentation, addition of suits and storage facilities, etc. The Single
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TABLE 5-6
MAXIMUM DISTANCE TRAVELED TO SAFETY BY A CREWMAN
CASE
FIGURE
NUMBER
CREWMAN
INVOLVED
DISTANCE
TRAVELED
TO SAFE
COMPARTMENT
DISTANCE
TRAVELED
TO SUIT
DISTANCE
TRAVELED
TO ERV
Single Launch
Space Station
5-3 #4 35 feet 54 feet 61 feet
5-4 #4 11 19 71
5-5 #3 35 38 62
5-6 #4 35 54 bl
Early Orbital
Space Station
5 -10 #6 24 24 51
5--11 #5 23 78 78
5 -12 #5 8 18 80
5-13 #3 13 24 54
NASA Phase B
5 -1 #6 16 -- --
5-17 #1 4 -- --
5-18 #2 4 -- --
5-19 #8 16 -- --
NOTE:
a. Distance traveled to safe compartment---A "Safe Compartment" is one
that isolates the crew member involved from the emergency, and con-
tains a suit for him or allows safe access to a location containing
a suit for him.
b. Distance traveled to suit---Is the distance to the closest suit which
is in a compartment not affected by the emergency, and which is made
specifically for the crew member involved.
c. Distance traveled to ERV---The ERV considered in each case is that
which contains a suit specifically made for the crew member involved.
d. Already suited crewmen are not considered herein (EVA cases).
e. For the EOSS cases shown, suits for crew members stowed in the forward
(MDAM) and aft (Deck 4) modules have been reversed in order to improve
suit availability, i.e., suits for crew members 1, 4 and 5 are stowed
in the aft module (see EOSS Suit Location).
f. Distance to suits and ERV's is not presented for the NASA Phase B
Space Station, since they are not used or are not considered as emer-
gency devices in that configuration.
r`
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Launch Space Station distances can be drastically reduced by the addition
of a second hatch, opposite the existing one, in the bottom deck between
the inner and outer modules. For instance, consider crew member 4 in
Figure 5-6. If the new hatch were installed, his distance to a safe com-
partment would drop from 35 feet to 12 feet; similarly, his distance to
his suit would drop from 54 feet to 32 feet. Such reductions are also
obtainable in other Single Launch Space Station cases.
The NASA Phase B 12-Masi Space Station has the lowest distance to safety
of the three concepts considered. Figures 5-16 and 5-19 represent the
extreme distance from a safe compartment in this station. These distances
could be reduced even further by the incorporation of two additional inner
outer module hatches 900
 from the existing hatches and opposite each
other. It is recognized that a trade study would be necessary to justify
this change. It would seem that the optimum configuration from a distance-
to-safety standpoint wound be the inner/outer module concept, which is
isolated between decks and between inner and outer modules.
5.7
	
CONCLUSIONS
This task assumed that pressure suits (Apollo Block II) would be used as
emergency survival devices. Primarily because of the long time required
to don the suit, it does not appear acceptable as a survival device. In
addition, because the suits are individually fitted and a crewman can use
only his personal suit, a considerable number of suits would be required
	 -_
if they are to be readily available in emergencies. It is concluded that
a universal, quick-donning survival device should be provided and that
each compartment should contain sufficient of these devices to accommodate
all crew members who might normally be in that compartment.
With respect to crew distribution, instances were found in which a majority
of the crew was in the same compartment at the same time. This situation
should be avoided and a minimum number of crew members allowec to occupy a
compartment; because, if an emergency occurred in the occupies, compartment,
a large proportion of the crew could be lost or, at any rate, evacuation
of the compartment would be impeded. On the other hand, it was also found
that about two-thirds of the crew's activities are directed toward their
own health and well-being, e.g., sleeping, eating, recreation, personal
hygiene, and medical. It followed that about two-thirds of the crew's
time was spent in areas devoted to these activities, with a consequent
undesirable concentration of the crew in these areas. While scheduling
and crew discipline may alleviate this situation somewhat, attention should
be directed to making high crew density areas as safe as possible. An
approach to this would be to ensure that all hazards necessarily on-board
the space station, such as equipment, materials, experiments, procedures,
and the like, be located in other than high crew density areas.
Regarding crew movement and traffic, all traffic routes should be sized
such that a crew member wearing protective equipment has access to all
parts of the station. Routes should also be sized so as to accommodate
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necessary traffic, including two-way traffic, under emergency conditions.
All compartments should have at least two escape routes and these should
not terminate in a common compartment, this to minimize the possibility
of crew members becoming trapped in an emergency. Emergency procedures,
including designation of traffic routes should be developed, personnel
should be instructed in the procedures, and the procedures should be
practiced.
To assure that all crew members are aware of an emergency, an automatic
emergency detection system should be provided which can locate and identify
hazardous conditions. Also, a means should be provided to determine the
conditions within isolated or unoccupied areas before crew members enter
the area, this to avoid inadvertent spread of a hazardous condition.
C
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6.0 HUMAN REQUIREMENTS
6.1	 INTRODUCTION
In the area of human requirements, a primary objective in the design of a
spacecraft is to provide an environmental envelope in which the mission
can be carried out in comfort, maximum efficiency, and without injury to
the occupants. Contamination by potentially toxic or hazardous materials
of the closed ecological system of the spacecraft is z. basic concern in
dv.:,ign, maintenance, and operation. This section presents data that de-
monstrates the necessity for attention to safety measures, including:
materials selection, quality control, instrumentation capable of qualita-
tively and quantitatively monitoring the environment, and methods for the
eradication or control of toxic contaminants. A brief summary of toxi-
cology considerations which apply to occupants of any spacecraft, is
given. Known and potential spacecraft contaminants are listed.
A second primary objective in the human requirements area is to provide
for those medical facilities and skills which are necessary to assure that
the crew maintains an acceptable level of physical and mental health. Two
distinct approaches are required, preventive medicine and clinical medicine.
A brief discussion of the salient points of these two approaches is given.
6.2	 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
6.2.1	 TOXICOLOGY RACKGROUND
Toxicology is that branch of biological science which deals with the
adverse effects of chemical substances on living tissue. Since all sub-
stances can have an adverse effect on the body at some quantity or con-
centration, toxicity is inherent in all substances, depending on the
intensity and duration of the exposure (Reference No. 33). The body,
through normal processes, is capable of resisting toxic effects up to a
point. If that point is exceeded, then adverse effects may occur. In
general, the more intricate the organization of the system and the more
complex the steps in the biochemical process, the more liable the system
is to injury (Reference No. 67).
Exposure to chemical substances may be single, repeated, or continuous.
As a rule, a single exposure, if it does not result in death, does not
produce persistent deleterious effects in biochemistry, physiology, or
structure. Recovery occurs fairly rapidly. However, substances taken into
the body repeatedly or continuously, while not producing immediate change,
may slowly exert a deleterious effect in one of two ways. Either the sub-
stance may collect in the body to such an extent that, eventually, the
concentration-is great enough to cause change, or repeated small injuries
may summate to the point where normal biochemical, physiological, or
(	
tissue restorative abilities are exhausted (Reference No. 105).
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6.2.1.1
	 ABSORPTION
Insofar as spacecraft crews are concerned, chemicals will enter the body
principally through inhalation and skin absorption, with oral ingestion
possible but less likely. With inhalation, absorption is rapid and maximum
chemical levels in the blood are quickly reached. The total quantity
absorbed by this route is influenced by the rate and volume of respiration,
the concentration of the contaminant, and the percentage extracted from the
air.
Experience indicates that the following contaminants have fairly eas,*
access to the cell interior once they are absorbed into the body: gases,
fat soluble compounds, organic bases, and un-ionized combinations of weak
acids.
The following contaminants penetrate the cell membrane poorly: compounds
with high water solubility, salts of organic bases, and highly ionized com-
pounds.
	
6.2.1.2	 ELIMINATION
The principal routes of excretion of toxic substances are the expired air,
urine, and feces. Less important, but not to be ignored, are the sloughed
skin and perspiration. The more rapid the excretion, the less likely are
toxic effects to occur.
	
6.2.1.3	 DOSE-RESPONSE
The quantitative relationships of dose to response are exceedingly important
in the theoretical and practical evaluations of toxic action. For all sub-
stances, the greater the dose, the more severe is the response or the more
rapid is its onset. With some substances, time is an equally important
factor in determining effect.
	
6.2.1.4
	 PHYSICAL STATE
Chemicals which enter the body through the respiratory tract do so in the
form of gases, vapors, or particulates. In the context of the space en-
vironment, particulate matter is relatively more important than in other
forms of environmental exposure. Aerosols of smoke, dust, fogs, or fumes
may be present for lonjser periods than on Earth, because of the absence of
the settling effect of normal Earth gravity.
	
6.2.1.5	 INTERACTION OF MULTIPLE COMPONENTS
Rarely are individual chemical toxicants present alone. In the problem of
a spacecraft ., and particularly considering a space station or base in which
chemicals are deliberately brought aboard for experimental purposes, many
hundreds of chemicals and compounds may be present. The difficulty in
evaluating the milieu of possible contaminants is the interaction which
occurs due to the combined effect of these substances.
1
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6.2.1.6	 UNUSUAL RESPONSES
In addition to the usual effects which may be predicted in the average
individual, based on the observation of physiological, biochemical, and
pathological changes which occur when sufficient doses of a toxicant are
encountered, there are also unusual responses. These are unusual in that
they occur generally at much lower doses than might be expected, require
previous contact with the substance, or result in changes which are
different from those normally expected.
McNamara (Reference No. 10) describes animal tests for the detection of
subtle minimal toxic actions of chemicals. In the compounds he studied,
positive effects could usually be noted with a one percent of the LD50
dose. With some compounds these effects were still measurable at 1,000th
of this quantity. In addition to careful observation for overt toxicologi-
cal signs, tests included the ability of a rodent to maintain balance on a
horizontal rod and to descend a vertical rod, forced activity in dogs,
escape avoidance tests, visual discrimination tests, and volitional acti-
vity. When the ratio between effective doses in animals and the approxi-
mate dose producing impairment of performance in man were compared, with
only one compound did the effect occur in man with a smaller dose. Ten
of 48 showed approximately comparable doses. The remainder varied from
2 to 100 times larger in terms of an increased response on the part of man.
	
6.2.1.7	 METHODS OF EXPRESSING TOXICITY
The quantity of chemical which produces an undesirable (toxic) effect is
defined in standard terms. One procedure describes the quantity in terms
of a weigh~ or volume of material per unit weight of the subject, for ex-
ample, mg/kg. When speakinof the concentrations of a gas or particulate
in the air, either a volume volume relationship, parts per million (ppm),
or a weight/volume relationship, mg/M3, is generally employed. In air
exposures the length of contact in minutes or hours is included. In the
case of lethal concentrations or doses, the abbreviations LC or LD are
used, respectively. Because of individual differences in subjects, a given
concentration may be lethal to some, but not all, in which case percent
lethality is shown by a subscript; e.g., LD50 indicates a dose which is
lethal to 50 percent of the subjects tested. When subscripts are not used,
the value has probably been based on limited observations and, hence, lacks
statistical validity.
	
6.2.1.8	 BASIS OF EVALUATION
Data considered in establishing toxicological standards include the physi-
cal and chemical properties of the substance, the uses an' type of exposures
which are anticipated, toxicity data gained from animal experimentation,
extrapolation of animal data to man, and human experience.
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6.2.1.9	 HUMAN EXPERIENCE
Whenever available, human experience is considered in predicting safe
levels, since evidence from this source is directly usable. The effects
of accidental exposures resulting in toxic effects, when documented by
the measurement of air concentrations producing these, are of the highest
value. Measurements made in industrial establishments, where physical
examination and clinical laboratory testk of personnel are conducted
periodically and where air concentrations are monitored, are also excel-
lent documentation of effect levels. Determination of threshold limits
of irritation and unpleasant or irritating atmospheres is made by controlled
exposures of human volunteers to noxious atmospheres. These studies gen-
erally suffer from the shortness of the exposure and the differences which
are seen between members of a test group who are not accustomed to indus-
trial atmospheres. Experimentation on behavior in man is rarely used, but
is potentially of great value.
6.2.2	 AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
That portion of toxicology which deals with noxious, untoward, and poten-
tially dangerous chemical substances which are constantly in the environ-
ment of man is a relatively new science. It has developed chiefly because
of public concern regarding air and water pollution and the appearance of
various chemical substances in food. The problems of man continuously
exposed in a closed system, as exists in the submarine of space capsule,
are relatively new.
Air quality standards are used as a measure of the acceptability of air
for human use. They describe contaminants in air at levels which will
not adversely affect the group which is exposed. They are intended to
promote maximum comfort, as well as protect against detrimental effei`.G
from continuing intake of any quantity of the contaminant. When consider-
ing the application of numerical values to air quality, much can be gained
from reference to industrial hygiene standards. These have undergone a
period of evolution and have gradually but surely moved in a downward
direction. One of the most important features of these standards is that
they are dynamic. There is always a place for the inclusion of information
on new contaminants or a change in the existing values for old compounds
whenever new evidence justifies the need. For our purposes, air quality
standards will be defined as the admissible concentration of a discrete
chemical substance or an identifiable mixture in the air of the spacecraft.
6.2.2.1
	 GROUPS COVERED BY AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
By far the greatest effort at environmental control has beeii spent on that
of employed persons. The first air quality standards were unofficial,
representing the considered opinion of persons interested in the protection
of the health of employed persons. Most of these values were used as
guides for the employer and were at a considerably higher level than is
now recognized as desirable. Since 1945 scientific associations and
s
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professional. societies have developed various sets of values. The best
known of these are Threshold Limit Values (TLV), which are promulgated by
the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).
The maximum allowable concentrations issued by the American Standards
Association's Z-37 Committee are also authoritative opinions.
	
6.2.2.2	 EMPLOYED PERSONS
Threshold Limits for industrial atmospheres are defined according to the
philosophy that, though chemical substances are toxic at some concentra-
tion, the limit established must be such that the substance will not be
injurious, regardless of how often the exposure is repeated. (This is
opposed to the philosophy which covers ionizing radiation, for which the
current concept is that thert is no threshold, that all exposures have an
associated risk to health.) Until 1963 the threshold limit value was
defined as the time-weighted concentration averaged over an 8-hour work
day, or Time-Weighted Average (TWA). This was in opposition to the maxi-
=,n allowable concentration philosophy defined by the Z-37 Committee of
the American Standards Asseciation, which established a limited concentra-
tion, or ceiling, below which all concentrations should fluctuate. A solu-
tion to this descrepancy was achieved by adopting a "ceiling concept" for
certain limits, or suitably lowering the limit and retaining the Time-
Weighted Average concept. Certain substances defined by threshold limits
were fast-acting and, therefore, no excursion above the limit should be
permitted. These were clarified by a "C" notation which indiea^ed that
the stated limit should not be exceeded. Time-weighted average concentra-
tions continued to be applied to all other listed values. The assignment
of "C" listings was made only when excursions of concentrations for 15-
minute periods might result in:
a. Intolerable irritation;
b. Chronic or irreversible tisLue change;
c. Narcosis to a sufficient degree to increase accident-proneness, impair
self-rescue, or materially reduce work efficiency.
	
6.2.2.3	 GUIDELINES FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL
The U. S. Navy Submarine Service was the first group to acquire control
guidelines for contaminants in the atmosphere to which persons might be
continually exposed for long periods of time. The description of the
development of these data in support of 90-day submergences is given by
Siegel (Reference Nos. 101, 64). Forty-one long-term, continuous runs
have been completed on 15 different materials important to the Navy. These
included paint thinners, nitrogen dioxide, ammonia, cumene, dimethylamine,
and Freon 12. Guidelines have been established or are in the process of
being extablished for 26 substances. Accepted levels are published in
NAVSHIPS 250-649-1 (Reference No. 110).
S
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6.2.2.4
	 ME'T'HODS :'OR ESTABLISHTING AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
When firs, established, air quality standard values reflected the arbi-
trary rp.Lnion of single individuals. It is customary at the present time
for the agency responsible for the promulgation of air quality standards
to convene expert committees to review the data prior to issuing a limit
value. For example, the California State Department of Public Health has
called experts from around the United States to review data relative to
community air quality standards in California, wherein only positive data
indicating the nature and scope of physical effects are considered. The
ACGIH has expanded its committee to 14 men who represent 10 different
states and Canada. All disciplines relative to the committee's objectives
are represented, including toxicology, engineering, industrial hygiene,
analytical chemist- r, and medicine. Solicitation is made by the committee
for information from all available sources, including universities, indus-
trial laboratories, and independent consultants.
6.3	 SPACECRAFT ODNTAMMATION
Contaminants present a formidable challenge in space-borne vehicles. The
problem can be resolved if the following approach is used. First, the
problem must be defined in terms of each contaminant, theoretically or
actually present in the closed system. Second, after the theoretical or
actual contaminants have been delineated, defined, and described, instru-
mentation must be designed for the qualitative and quantitative monitoring
of the substances. Finally, feasible methods for eradication or control
of these substances must be developed.
Three comprehensive reviews (Reference wos. 101, 40, 24) of this subject
have been made. It is apparent that, in the closed ecologic system of the
spacecraft, many con aminants will appear in the immediate environment of
the astronaut. Most of these would not be of concern were it not for the
peculiarities of the space vehicle's ecologic system. Here, input is
continuous, but outflow is limited, so a gradual accumulation of noxious
materials could occur over a period of time. This would lead to an unin-
habitable situation were not methods of control invoked.
Appendix 6A lists contaminants which have been identified or are suspected
as being in various spacecraft, test chambers, and submersible vehicles.
Also shown are the limit values in those cases in which a limit value has
been determined.
Contamination in a manned spacecraft can be expected to come from the man,
the spacecraft and its equipment, from external sources, or by secondary
generation. These sources are further discussed in the following para-
graphs.
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6.3.1	 MAN
The principal sources of man-produced contaminants are expired air, urine,
feces, flatus, perspiration, saliva, and sloughed skin. While carbon
dioxide is the principal contaminant of expired air, other contaminants
are also present. Excretion of water by a normal man averages 2,400 ml
daily, the principal loss being in the form of urine, which also contains
55-70 grams of solid material. Over 100 individual electrolytes, nitroge-
nous substances, lipids, carbohydrates, organic acids, vitamins, and
hormones have been identified in urine solids. Nitrogenous substances
account for the greatest mass of theser with urea being the principal
nitrogen-containing substance. The quantity of feces evacuated in 24 hours
is approximately 150 grams. The composition is principally food residue,
bacteria, materials secreted through the wall of the intestine, bile,
leukocytes, and sloughed epithelial cells. Bacteria usually constitute
about , nercent of the total solids. Flatus is a continually occurring
effluent tu. 4 will be introduced at varying, largely unpredictable intervals.
The principal intestinal gases are carbon dioxide, methane, organic sulfides,
hydrogen, and mercaptans. The volume and composition of these may be varied
by changes in the diet. Less work has been done on identification of the
constituents of saliva and perspiration. Chromatograms of whole saliva
reportedly indicate the presence of ammonia, acetone, methanol, ethanol,
methyl ethyl ketone, acetonitrile, and three volatile amines. Sweat has
C	
been indicated as containing trace quantities of phenols, urea, ammonia,
and electrolytes.
A source of contamination associated with, but not part of, man are the
micro-organisms, fungi, and algae, which co-exist with ma-. The nature of
these will be determined by the sy^:lbiotic relationships which develop
between the variety of micro-organisms which live in the body and on the
surface of man. Irvine (Reference No. 101) has estimated that 10 grams
of micro-organisms will be present after 60 days and that these, in them-
selves, may produce noxious gases.
6.3.2	 SPACECRAFT AND EQUIPMENT
Although not necessarily directly applicable to spacecraft, a useful
approach for examining possible sources of spacecraft contaminants lies in
studies of contamination in submarines. The relatively small volume of a
spacecraft permits a quick rise in concentration from a small source of
contaminating material. It has been estimated that only 0.0005 of the
amount of contaminant is needed to reach a similar concentration in the
air of a space capsule, such as Gemini, as in that of a submerged submarine.
Anderson and Saunders (Reference No. 101) have reported both ammonia and
monoethanolamine originating from devices used in controlling CO 2 levels;
hydrogen and -stibine from batteries; ozone produced by electronic and
electrical equip went; and radon from luminous dials. Other sources of
contaminants in submarines have been such common substances as polishes,
paints, lighter fluids, shaving soaps, and hair tonics (Reference No. 63).
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The materials used in spacecraft interior coatings are a source of contami-
nation. Thomas and Beck (Reference No. 101) have cited the problems of
"boil-off" or out-gassing induced through operations inside space capsules
at low pressures. Released materials derive from surfacing materials,
adhesives, plastics, plasticizers, oils, solvent fluids, and even metals.
A considerable list of materials (Appendix 6B) has been identified as
likely to be brought on-board the spacecraft in relatively large quantities.
In some cases, these materials have not previously been identified as
contaminants (Appendix 6c). owing to the amounts involved, however,
massive contamination of the spacecraft from these materials is possible
and could cause serious problems.
Until the precise nature of the structure of the spacecraft and the materi-
als which will go into it are known, it will be impossible to state with
certainty all of the possible contaminants. However, in selecting materi-
als to be used aboard a spacecraft, it is valuable to have a toxicological
check-list to determine the potential problems anticipated from the outgas-
sing, degradation, or accidental spillage of the material.
Toxic atmospheres result from thermal decomposition of electrical equip-
ment, hydraulic fluid, and oil. On occasion, selenium rectifiers have
given problems in aircraft. Pyrolysis of hydraulic fluids, including the
silicones, fluorohydrocarbons, and phosphate esters, have given off materi-
als which are irritating to the eyes and respiratory tract. Carbon mon-
oxide and aldehydes are frequent breakdown products on equipment failure.
Freon decomposition products form on contact with hot surfaces, and may
include hydrogen halides. Analysis of pressure suit atmospheres have
identified carbon dioxide, water vapor, and Freon refrigerant used in
prelaunch air-conditioning systems. When the malfunctioning of directional
stabilizing gyros was induced, low temperature greases volatilized and
epoxy-resin wedges and the electrical insulating varnish on windings
charred.
Thermal degradation of plastics will yield monomers, many of which are
toxic. Though this occurs generally at high temperatures, the percentage
conversion in the case of polytetrafluoroethylene, polymethacrylate, and
polymethylstyrene is high. The breakdown of plastics from large chain
fragments may also include small molecules not particularly related to the
structural unit; thus, methyl alcohol, hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric
acid, and hydrogen cyanide may result from the vinyl halide and acrylonitrile
polymers.
Mechanisms which produce abrasion of surfaces may physically generate small
particles, frequently in the smaller micron range. These particles may
have toxic or other deleterious effects or may cause equipment malfunction
or failure. -
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6.3.",
	
EXTRAVEHICULAR AND SECONDARILY GENERATED
Migration of external contaminants through the skin of the spacecraft is
unlikely. The pressure gradient is such that escape is more probable,
although there is a possibility of contamination from external sources
during airlock operation. A more probable external source is the radia-
tion in space which may create decomposition products from cabin materials.
While metals and inorganic materials are generally resistant to radiation,
organic substances, especially plastics, show marked changes.
Electromagnetic radiations may enter the capsule from without or be gene-
rated by on-board electrical systems. These wa-e-lengths may catalyze
the formation of aerosols similar to the photochemical reaction which
occurs in some industrial metropolitan areas.
Finally, interaction between materials originally on-board the spacecraft
with other materials or with the spacecraft equipment may generate toxic
contaminants not originally present (Reference No. 85).
6.3.4	 PROBLEM PECULIAR TO THE SPACECRAFT
The spacecraft poses several problems which are not encountered in the
ordinary toxic action of chemical substances and which must be considered
unique to the problem at hand.
6.3.4.1	 WEIGHTLESSNESS
An effect of weightlessness which may be of concern with respect to toxicity
is the absence of convection currents for circulation of the cabin air. In
the event that the environmental control system leaves "dead spots" in
the atmosphere, it is possible that this "deadness" of the air would result
in local toxic concentrations.
Aerosols in the spacecraft atmosphere may cause some trouble. There will
be a tendency for particles of greater diameter to remain suspended,
since the usual settling effect due to gravity will not be present. With
nose-breathing, this will probably constitute no problem, since particles
of 10 micron and greater would be trapped in the upper air passages. With
mouth-breathing, particles of a size greater than those encountered in the
non-weightless atmosphere may enter the respiratory tract and impinge on
the air passages or gain access to the lower portion of the respiratory
tree.
There is an open question concerning the ability of the body, under
weightlessness, to resist toxic effects. The employment of water-immersion
methods in simulating the weightless state has resulted in diuresis (exces-
sive excretion of urine), but, generally, our knowledge of the effects of
weightlessness on body organs and mechanisms which deal with toxic sub-
stances is very scanty.
1
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6.3.4.2	 ELEVATED OXYGEN TENSIONS
Schafer (Reference No. 12), in discussing the gaseous atmosphere require-
ments of manned space flight, has set the upper limit of oxygen partial
pressure in chronic exposure at a total pressure of 460 mm Hg for the
normal 80/20 nitrogen/oxygen atmosphere, or 60 percent of the oxygen
available at sea level for other atmospheres. Evidence is cited to indicate
that, experimentally, the combined effects of acceleration, breathing,in-
creased oxygen concentration, and chest cage constriction synergize to
produce collapse of the basal portion of the lung. Signs of pulmonary
oxygen toxicity have been noted in hospitalized patients receiving oxygen
therapy. Oxygen toxicity principally involves two body systems: the
respiratory, and the central nervous. Decreased vital capacity, symptoms
of stress beneath the sternum, and nasal irritation have all been related
to increased oxygen tensions. Confusion, motor disturbance, and coma are
reported in hyperbaric oxygen treatment.
	
6.3.4.3
	 ELEVATED RADIATION LEVELS
The effects of oxygen and ionizing radiation appear to be synergistic. The
same free-radical mechanism appears to be the damaging factor in both
oxygen toxicity and some types of radiation damage. Since increased
radiation levels may occur in space flight, this becomes a problem which
requires further investigation. There is little information concerning
the effect of radiation on the toxicity of substances acting on specific
body systems.
	
6.3.4.4	 ELECTROMAGNETIC ENERGIES
Beischer (Reference No. 37) has reviewed the problems of the extra-
terrestrial magnetic environment. The possible physiological and psycho-
logical influences of magnetic fields, or the absence of these fields, is
a matter of interest and concern. Only a few studies have been conducted
on the effects of toxic agents and magnetic forces acting at the same time.
In one of these studies iron oxide was deposited in the lungs of animals
and subjected to alternating magnetic Yields, which resulted in correspond-
ing movements of the particles but did not indicate an increased incidence
of fibrosis in the animal.
	
6.3.4.5
	
INCREASED PARTICULATE LOAD
Particulates, or aerosols, include small particles, either solid or liquid,
suspended in the air. Generally, these have a diameter of less than 50 µ.
The usual range is from 0.01 p to 10 p. Surface air on the Earth contains
a considerable aerosol load. The problem, unique in the closed living
space, is the tendency of these particles to increase in numbers and mean
diameters. Kinsey (Reference No. 101) reported that, in submerged nuclear
powered submarines, the concentration reached a steady state at about
0.4 pg/L in approximately 100 hours. This compared unfavorably with the
aerosol concentration in Los Angeles on a smoggy day, where the concentration
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averaged 0.2 µg/L. There was also approximately 8 times the content of
organic aerosols in the submarine. The stability of aerosols in the space
vehicle may parallel submarine experience. The effects include the in-
creased air load and the problems created by deposition of these materials
iii the 'ewer respiratory tract.
A second concern relative to these agents, in addition to their systemic
effect, is that they act as condensing nuclei for toxic gases. This
facilitates the entrance into the lower respiratory tract of such materials
which, because of their high water solubility, are generally trapped in the
upper respiratory tract. It also provides for local areas of extreme irri-
tation in the body, due to the concentration of the toxic gas in a finite
area. Verzer (Reference No. 53) called attention to the reaction of trace
quantities of hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide in the air of occupied
spaces, indicating that they may be readily transformed into nuclei,
probably sulfate, by the photochemical action of sunlight. He recommends,
therefore, the exclusion of this source of energy from the spacecraft.
Ammonia gas is also reported to form nuclei under the influence of sunlight.
	
6.3.4.6	 REDUCED PRESSURES
While current planning envisions Earth-normal atmosphere, e.g., 14.7 psi,
it is possible that lower pressures will be used which could amount to one-
half to two-thirds of an atmosphere. No data has been published relative
to the toxicity of contaminants at these reduced ambient pressures. The
amount of material available presumably would not be influenced by changes
in pressure. There is reason to believe, however, that the absorption
rate might be more rapid in the absence of the inert nitrogen molecules.
At one-half and two-thirds of an atmosphere, the number of blocking mole-
cules would be reduced by 30-50 percent. Conversely, since absorption of
gas through the alveolar membrane is a process of simple diffusion and
therefore related to external pressure, the quantity taken per unit time
would be decreased by a factor of two or three. The overall effect would
probably not significantly alter the absorption rate.
	
6.3.4.7	 VIBRATION
Changes in peripheral circulation, heart activity, and respiration have
been observed as transient responses to moderate vibrations. Temperature
decreases in the lower extremity are apparently due to impairment of the
circulation to that part. Tissue damage in the form of hemorrhages in the
brain, heart, and lungs occur at higher levels. While there is no reason
to believe these forces would accelerate the toxic action of a chemical
contaminant, those agents which primarily affect the central nervous
system might increase the occurrence of a physiologically unstable state.
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6.3.4.8	 NOISE
There is no data at present concerning the effects of continuous low-level
equipment noises in the spacecraft itself. Crew members will presumably
be exposed to noise of this type in their environment without the benefit
of recovery periods. As most noises, both moderate and high level, act
as a stress factor and add to general fatigue, these factors may contribute
to a greater overall physiologic effect from toxic agents that have central
nervous systerd stimulatory activity.
6.3.5	 ESTABLISHMENT OF TLV'S FOR SPACECRAFT
Toxicity of substances occurring in a closed ecologic system was the
subject of a symposium sponsored by the Lockheed Missile and Space Company
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1963 (Reference
No. 101). The most enlightening paper in this symposium relative to the
problem at hand was presented by H. E. Stockinger, of the U. S. Public Health
Service. Considering the problems of differential pressures, the continuous
dosage, temperature changes, restricted motion, increased oxygen ccneentra-
tion, fatigue, and the interactions of all of these factors, he derived a
formula by which calculations were made of probable acceptable Threshold
Limit Values (TLV) for continual occupancy. These were based on a modi-
fication of TLV's now accepted in industry. The ratios between the indus-
trial and space TLV's ranged from 3.3:1 to 50:1 in the 12 compounds for
which calculations were shown. The approach, of course, was limited to
those compounds for which industrial TLV's had been established. The
toxicity of substances of importance in 90-day submergence of personnel
in submarines is under investigation at the toxicology laboratory of the
Naval Medical Research Institute under the direction of Dr. Siegel. Pre-
liminary data from the latter source has indicated that "no-effect" levels
may be expected for most compounds at approximately one-half to one-third
of the presently established industrial TLV figures.
6.3.6	 THE MULTICONTAMINANT ATMOSPHERE
A study of the combined action of substances exerting a similar type of
toxic effect is complicated and rarely undertaken. An evaluation of agents
which have different sites of action but operate simultaneously in the
same system is even more difficult. To date, no research groups have
approached this problem of the multicontaminated atmosphere in depth, with
the exception of the studies conducted by Dr. Sandage, of the Mid-West
Research Institute. These were sponsored by the Biomedical Laboratory of
the U. S. Air Force at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. Ex-
posures were made both to the single components alone and jointly in combi-
nation, four or five at a time. The compounds examined were hydrogen sulfide,
methyl mercaptan, indole, skatole, carbon tetrachloride, and phenol. These
are substances with potent and diverse actions. In all cases, the effects
of the multiple exposures exceeded those produced by any single agent. With
few exceptions, all other continuous exposure toxicological work from which
data can be extracted is based on single, rather than multiple, contaminant
exposures.
j
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6.4	 MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The medical function requires that provision be made to monitor the health
of the crew or to acquire other information throughout the mission, to
ensure, within acceptable risk levels, that the crew returns to Earth
in good health. Medical considerations were incorporated in the various
tasks of the study through a supporting effort and are, therefore, dis-
cussed only briefly here. Two aspects of the medical function are consi-
dered, preventive medicine and clinical medicine.
6.4.1	 PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
The intent of preventive medicine is to prevent disease and. promote physi-
cal and mental health and efficiency. It iE especially concerned with all
circumstances dealing with the predisposing factors which increase an
individual's vulnerability to disease, provoking factors which initiate or
precipitate a disease process, and perpetuating factors which tend to
cause disease progrfs:.ion. Preventive medicine may be divided into two
aspects: that which deals directly with personnel and that which deals
with hardware directly affecting the crew.
Personnel aspects include such things as crew selection and training,
immunization, and personal and mental hygiene. With the exception of some
aspects of personal and mental hygiene, these functions are generally per-
(	 formed prior to the space mission. The Safety Study, being constrained
to on-orbit operation only, used the assumption that all crew members arrive
in orbit in good health, with no incipient physical or mental defects, and
competent, whether by training or otherwise, to perform all assigned tasks.
Anything prerequisite to this assumption is not specifically covered by the
study, although some factors may be implicit in study results.
Hardware aspects include provision of life support and protection sub-
systems, maintenance of a habitable environment, provision of sanitary
facilities, provision of means for exercise and relaxation, and the like.
Support with respect to these aspects was provided to other tasks in the
study and the medical considerations with respect to hardware are, there-
fore, implicit in the results of other tasks.
6.4.2	 CLINICAL MEDICINE
Clinical medicine deals with the medical resources and services required
to diagnose and treat any illness or injury incurred by crew members. It
is assumed that preventive measures will not be completely effective in
precluding illness or injury and provision for clinical medicine will be
an important feature of the spacecraft..
c
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6.4.2.1	 MEDICAL PERSONNEL
A physician is highly desirable as a crew member and will be required to
conduct important medical experiments, such as those described in the
Biomedical and Behavioral Research Functional Program Element (Reference
No. 14). In the absence of a physician, some other crew member should be
trained or have medical experience in handling medical emergencies. Short-
term or minor illnesses and injuries may be treated by a responsible crew
member, providing his medical background is appropriate and adequate
facilities are provided. In addition, assistance from ground control
facilities is possible, providing appropriate communication links, such
as closed-circuit TV, are available.
In any event, a station Health and Safety Officer should be designated,
presumably the physician or medical crew member. His responsibilities
should include (Reference No. 122): the housekeeping aspects of the space-
craft, development and use of safe operating procedures, proper utilization
of personal protective equipment and clothing, identification and prelimi-
nary diagnosis of illness and injury, prognosis of illness and injury,
decisions as to quarantine requirements, and administration of treatment
to ill or injured crew members.
	
6.4.2.2	 MEDICAL SERVICES
Medical services include examination, testing, diagnosis, and treatment;
and treatment, in turn, includes medication, surgery, and physical therapy.
In this regard, the Biomedical and Behavioral Research Functional Program
Element (Reference No. 14) contemplates use of an Integrated Medical and
Behavioral Laboratory Measurement System (IMBLMS). The IMBLMS is intended
to provide the facilities needed to conduct medical and behavioral experi-
ments involving examination and testing of the crew members themselves.
It can be expected that medical and behavioral. experiments will be con-
tinued in both the space station and space base over several years of
operation. Consideration should be given, therefore, to use of IMBLMS,
perhaps with special added modules, for routine, as well as experimental,
monitoring of crew member's health.
In view of the crew selection, medical monitoring, and (possibly) preflight
quarantine processes, the probability of serious illness during the space
mission appears quite remote, but the possibility does exist. M'nor ill-
nesses and injuries may be expected, with a possibility of seriou, injury.
There is, of course, the still unknown area of the seriousness of the effects
of long-duration missions on the crew.
It may be feasible to evacuate seriously ill or injured crew members to
Earth for treatment. At the time of the Safety Study, preliminary informa-
tion on the Advanced Space Shuttle indicates that the forces during reentry
would not exceed two and one-half (21) "g's", and that high only momentarily.
This is comparable to medical evacuation aircraft. It would appear, then,
that evacuation to Earth of seriously ill or injured personnel would hinge
more on operational considerations than on medical.
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The treatment facilities required would be primarily those necessary fcr
treatment of minor illnesses and injuries, with provision for temporary
care of major illnesses or injuries. A clinic for examination, testing,
and diagnosis will be necessary, which, as previously noted, might well be
combined with the medical experimentation laboratory. A sick bay also
should be provided for at least temporary care. Although serious communi-
cable diseases are not likely, it may be desirable to include provisions
in the sick bay for hospital-type isolation.
There appears to be no need for a hyperbaric chamber. Crew members may be
exposed to accidental decompression or may be unexpectedly effected by low
pressures during operations such as EVA. Treatment would require only
return to normal station pressure, however. Hyperbaric treatment is indi-
cated for certain diseases caused by anaerobic organisms or for certain
circulatory defects. The possibility of these occurring on the space
station is considered highly remote. If, on the basis of further data,
an hyperbaric chamber is indicated, consideration should be given to use
of an airlock for the purpose.
Or. a long-duration space,mission there is a possibility of crew fatalities.
Provision should be made for preservation of the body, an autopsy if
required,.and return of the body to Earth. If space burial is authorized,
it will be necessary to preserve the necessary tissue samples for a later
autopsy.
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APPENDIX 6A
MATERIALS---OCCURRENCES---LIMITS
This appendix lists contaminants or materials which have been identified
or suspected in the atmospheres of spacecraft, test chambers, or submarines.
The list was compiled from a variety of sources, including: Atmospheric
Contaminants in Spacecraft (Reference No. 11), U. S. Navy 1962 Atmosphere
Habitability Data Book (Reference No. 10), Contamination Patterns in the
Enclosed Atmosphere of Mercury Spacecraft (Reference No. 17), and Nuclear
Power Submarine Atmosphere Control (Reference No. 63). For the most part,
these materials are trace contaminants.
The listing shows the name of the material and its molecular weight.
Under occurrences are shown the vehicle in which the material was identi-
fied or its existence suspected. Atmospheric limits are given for those
materials for which a limit has been established. The limits shown are
in parts-per-raillion and include: American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) Threshold Limit Values (TLV's); 1-hour, 24-
hour, and 90-day submarine limits; Boeing Company Limits; and Douglas
limits for continuous exposure, which require an "alert" status, and which
gall for mission abort.
Letters appearing fron time to time in the listing are:
b --- Submarine levels which are
Aliphatic hydrocarbons, 	 --- 60 mg/M3
Aromatic hydrocarbons other than benzene --- 10 mg/M3
Benzene	 --- 3 mg/M3
T --- Tentative values based on ACGIH Threshold Limit Values, 1966.
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APPENDIX 6B
E GWIMENTAL/OPERATIONAL MATERIALS
The materials listed in this appendix are those which were identified by
the Saturn V Single Launch Space Station Study ( SLSS) (Reference Nos. 79,
80, 81) as likely to be brought on-board the space station for operational
or experimental uses. As contrasted to the materials listed in Appendix
6A, which are primarily trace contaminants, these materials may be present
in relatively large amounts. This leads to the possibili:. ;^ of massive
contamination, as well as trace contamination of the statlun or some areas
of it.
The listing shows the name of the material concerned and the toxic levels,
if levels have been determined, for 8-hour Threshold Limit Value (TLV) and
90-day continuous expcsu_rc. The effects of the material on various body
systems are shown with the means by which the material is toxic or hazard-
ous. In addition to toxicity, some materials may be hLzardous for other
reasons, which are also shown_.
C
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RESIDUAL MATERIALS
The materials) isted in Appendix 6A have already beeli identified as present
or likely to be present. in spacecraft atmospheres. It is assumed, there-
fore, that the Environmental Control/Life Support. System (EC/LSS) in future
spacecraft will provide for their identification and/or removal if there
are any hazards involved. It follows that the EC/LSS will also accommodate
hazards from the materials listed in Appendix 6B, with the provisos that
the materials are common tc both lists and that the degree of contamination
is within the capacity of the EC/LSS to handle.
There are, however, a number of materials included in the experimental/
operational materials listing of Appendix 6B which do not appear to have
been identified by Appendix 6A as present or likely to be present in space
stations. These "residual" materials are listed in this Appendix 6C.
Provisions must be made for their control if they are, in fact, on-board
the spacecraft.
Ammonium Thiocyanate	 Potassium Alum (Potassium Aluminum
Sulfate)
Amines (Ammonia Derivatives) 	 Phenidone
Aniline Dyes (Aminobenzene,	 Poly Vinyl Fluoride
Phenylamine)
Charcoal
	
Potassium Hydroxide---Solid
Cadmium Metal
	
Sulfur Trioxide
Detergents
	
Sodium Hydroxide---Solid
2 -3 Dimethyl Quinozaline	 Sodium Thiosulfate
Ester Polyester with Hydrophilic
Gelatin
Lithium Hydroxide
Monomethyl Hydrazine
Nickel Metal
Nitrogen Tetroxide
Phenidone --- Ftiydroquinone---
Thiosulfate
Potassium Bromide
Sodium Sulfite
Sodium Carbonate
Silica Gen (Silicic Acid)
Soaps
Tri,:hloroacetic Acid
Thiourea (Thiocarbamide)
Tissue Stains
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7.0 METEOROID PENETRATION ANALYSIS
7.1	 INTRODUCTION
In this analysis, the meteoroid environment hazards associated with the
space station during its orbital stay were examined. Based cn the con-
figuration concept presented in Section 2.0 of this document, some basic
calculations are given to arrive at total exterior surface exposure over
the ten-year mission. Using this value, in conjunction with other infor-
mation, a determination was made of the meteoroid mess and diameter for
which protection must be provided and the shield weight required was cal-
culated. For comparative purposes, and where possible, some parametric
data is shown for both the space station and the SLSS system. Data for
the latter was derived during the SLSS study conducted under Contract
NAS9 -6816, and is presented in the report on that study (Reference No. 81).
Some preliminary results of an investigation of meteoroid penetration
effects are given.
7.2	 METEOROID PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS
7.2.1	 METEOROID FLUX
The meteoroid flux given in NASA DS-21, "Meteoroid Environment---Near-Earth
and Cis-Lunar," (Reference No. 58) was used in this study. It provides
an estimate of the number of strikes by meteoroids of various sizes per
unit area per unit time. However, it should be noted that other estimates
of meteoroid flux vary considerably frog. the one used.
7.2.2	 STATION EXPOSURE
Table 7-1 summarizes the gross parameters for the space station and the
SLSS baseline vehicle, including the exposure during the mission for each.
TABLE 7-1
SPACE STATION PARAMETERS
MISSION DIAMETER LENGTH TOTAL AREA MODIFIER RE
(1008/ft2-hr)(ft) (ft) (ft2) 2 )AREA (ft
SLSS 33 30.8 5320 3640 .637*
SPACE
STATION 33 53.5 7280 496o 4.35*'(1) (2) (3) (4)
C
i
Notes: (1) Pressurized compartment only.
(2) Includes end surfaces.
(3) Modified to include Earth shielding at 260-nautical mile
altitude.
(4) *Two-year mission	 *-Ten-year mission.
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7.2.3	 METEOROID DESIGN MASS
The meteoroid size which established the penetration protection require-
ments can be determined from the flux, exposures, and the Poisson's
probability distribution function as discussed in Appendix I to Reference
No. 81. In this study, a nomogram, Figure 7-1, taking the foregoing
into account, was used to estimate meteoroid size (Reference No. 59)•
The probability level stipulated for the space station system as defined
in Reference No. 92 is P( 0 ) <_ 0.9 (i.e., the probability of zero pene-
trations in a ten-year mission shall be 0.9). For comparative purposes,
a probability of one or less penetration, P 1 , at the same level was also
examined. For the SLSS, P(1) and P(0) - 0.^9^ for a two-year mission.
The nomogram, Figure 7-1, was used to estimate the particle mass and diam-
eter for varying probability and exposure (Reference No. 59). As it indi-
cates, the meteoroid associated with a penetration probability of P(1) = 0.9,
a total surface exposure of 4.35 x 10 8 ft2-hr., and the flux stipulated in
Reference No. 58, has a mass of 0.0054 grams, and a diameter of 0.107
inches. When zero penetrations at the same probability level, i.e.:
P(o) = 0.9, are considered, the nomogram reflects a meteoroid of 0.02
grams mass and 0.167 inch diameter.
The particle design mass diameters for the stations and probabilities
considered are summarized in Table 7-2. Again, it should be pointed out,
that the data given for the SLSS station is for a 0.999 probability level,
and a two-year mission.
TABLE 7-2
METEOROID MASS AND DIAMETER
MISSION STATION
DI.A.
(ft)
EXPOSURE
(108ft2-hr)
P( 1 )
0.999	 0.9
P(0)
0.999	 0.9
m
(gm)
Dia.
(in)
m
(gm)
Dia.
(in)
m
(gm)
Dia.
(in)
m
(gm)
Dia.
(in)
SLSS 33 o.637 0.0102 0.134 0.179 0.346
SPACE
STATION 33 4.35 0.04 0.19 0.0054 0.107 0.05 0.54 0.02 0.167
7.2.4 SHIELD WEIGHT
The total shield weight required for protection against the meteoroids
defined above was estimated using the following equation taken frotr
Reference No. 68,
w = 41.51 kmC.352,
^i
^z
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where
W - total shield weight assuming t o sheets of aluminum
spaced two inches apart, lb/ft ,
k = constant associated with the shield configuration,
= 1/5, and
m = particle mass, grams.
The results for both the SLSS baseline vehicle and the . space station each
with a 33-foot diameter are shown in Table 7-3.
TABLE 7-3
TOTAL SHIELD WEIGHT (lb/ft2)
MISSION P(1)	 < 0.999 P( 0 )	 < 0.999 P(1) _<	 0.9 P( 0 )	 S 0.9
SLSS 1.65 4.54
SPACE
STATION 2.68 8.10 1.32 2.105
There is a significant increase in the shielding weight requirements when
the probability of penetration is decreased from "one" to it 	 i.e.:
n - 1 to n - 0. Likewise, in the case of the space station, when the
probability level is changed from 0.999 to 0.9, the shielding weight re-
quirement is significantly decreased.
The equation used above does not proportion between the bumper and the
pressure wall. The meteoroid bumper construction will be governed by
several factors, including radiator concepts, boost loading, etc.
7.2.5	 METEOROID PROTECTION VERSUS PRESSURE CONSIDERATIONS
Sizing of the space station walls may be governed by either meteoroid pro-
tection or pressure considerations. Figure 7-2 has been adapted frean the
SLSS study report (Reference No. 81) and summarizes the station wall re-
quirements for both these considerations. The wall configuration used in
developing this plot is shown in the figure. It consists of a meteoroid
bumper spaced two inches from a thin wall pressure shell. Again, both the
space station and the SIBS baseline station are shown.
Wall sizing requirements for both vehicles were compared at an operating
pressure of 14.7 psia and a penetration probability of 0.999. In addition,
since the space station has been given a 0.9 probability level, wall re-
quirements for this value are also shown.
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Certain preliminary conclusions may be drawn from Figure 7-2.
• At a probability level of P;0) - 0.9, the space station wall is
designed by internal pressure requirements for all diameters above
approximately 21.5 feet and meteoroid protection requirements below
that value.
• At a probability level of P(1) - 0.999, the space station wall is
designed by internal pressure requirements for all diameters above
approximately 28.5 feet and meteoroid protection requirements below
that value.
7.3	 METEOROID PENETRATION EFFECTS
:Dme effects of meteoroid penetration were considered with respect to de-
compression, station motion and pressure/temperature decay.
7.3.1	 DECOMPRESSION ANALYSIS
The problem of decompression associated with a meteoroid puncture of a
pressurized compartment is extremely complicated when all factors are
considered. For purposes of this study it was considerably simplified by
assuming isothermal and isentropic flow processes and hole-out areas
determined from meteoroid penetration tests.
If it is assumed that the environmental control system maintains a constant
air temperature in a compartment that has been punctured by a meteoroid,
the pressure decay can be expressed as follo'
P - Poe-t/r
For compressible isothermal flow, the t
	 constant, r, becomes
0+1
r- V o +1 2 0 -1	 V
CA ( 2 )	 — CA
and	
1.728
`
P - pressure after time, t,
t - decompression time, seconds,
Po
 - initial pressure, peia,
V = compartment volume (in3),
C - speed of sound in compartment - R g - 1.37 x 104 in/sec,
A = hole-out area (in2),
o - ratio of specific heats - 1.4,
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R - universal gas constant - 662 in-lb/lb-oR,
To - initial gas temperature = 5250R (65°F), and
g = acceleration due to gravity - 386 in/sec2.
For purposes of analysis, the following compartment volume has been assumed:
Diameter	 Volume
(feet)	 (feet3)	 (id x 106)
33	 7258	 12.53
This volume is an approximation of that contained in the outer module of
each deck of the conceptual 12-man space station. Actual gas volume would
be less due to equipment in the compartment.
The pressure shell hole-out area associated with meteoroids of various
diameters penetrating different bumper shell combinations has been esti-
mated by another study (Reference No. 59). One such estimate is repro-
duced in Figure 7-3 and indicates that, in the worst case, the hole-out
area can be approximately 20 times the square of the particle diameter.
The meteoroid protection requirements for the space station are 'cased upon
P(1) !S 0.9, with the resulting particle diameters being a minimum size
for which the shield must be designed. To establish a worst case for
purposes of the Safety Study, the particle diameter associated with
a P( 0 ) = 0. 999 is examined. Using the exposure of 4.35 x 108ft2-hr.
associated with a 33.0-foot diameter space sta''.ion, the particle diameter
is 0.54 inches, the hole-out area is 5.84 square inches and the hole-out
diameter 2.72 inches, all figures being approximations. Assuming an initial
compartment pressure of 14.7 psia and that man can survive to 5.44 psia,
and still. be capable of taking evasive or corrective action before losing
consciousness, a decompression time of 268 seconds is calculated. However,
some modification of this time should be made. First, the particle diameter
used is based on P(0) - 0.999 for the entire station exposure. The , prob-
ability level associated with this particle size would be significantly
higher for a single compartment. Second, the flow process was assumed
isothermal. if isentropic flow is assumed, the preriure decay can be
expressed as:
P Po [+atl[2OJ
where	
J
o+1/	 ^2 a +1
a-\a21V^^a+l)	 z 0.116 V
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The time required for a pressure drop from 14.7 to 5.44 psis, calculated
on the same values as before, is 207 seconds. However, the internal
temperature at this time is
o -1
0
T = To( P )	 = 3930R (-660F),0
assuming the initial temperature (To) is 52501R. Freezing temperatures are
approached in approximately 52 seconds. These results provide reasonable
estimates upon which crew reaction times can be based.
7 . 3 .2	 STATION MOTION ANALYSIS
To provide a preliminary estimate of the potential problem of station
motion resulting from a meteoroid penetration near one end of the station,
the following analysis was made:
i
where
assume the station geometry shown below:
I = 7.5 x 106
 slug-ft2 , and
4 = 25 feet
The gas weight contained within a typical compartment is
W = PoV
12 R 
where
W = gas weight, lbs.,
Po
 = initial compartment pressure, 14.7 psia,
V = compartment volume = 12.53 x 106 in3,
T = initial gas temperature = 5250R, and
R = gas constant = 55.2 ft-lb/lb-OR
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t
The gas weight is approximately 530 po lmds. Conservatively assuming an
isothermal specific impulse, Isp, of 65 seconds (nitrogen), the impulsive
torque, F, would be
F = WI sp C =( 530)(65)(2;) = 8.62 x 10 5 ft-lb-sec
The resulting spin rate would be
= 
r 8.6
I	 5x106
= 0.115 rad/sec
= 1.09 rpm
The centrifugal force field at the extremity of the station would be
_ Cw 2 = 25(0.115)2g	 32.2	 32.2
= 0.0103 g
Based or. this simplified analysis, station motion resulting from a
meteoroid puncture does not appear to represent a critical pruolem. The
spin rates and "g" levels are believed sufficiently low to permit repair,
even if the stability and control system cannot counteract the motion.
7.4	 TEST PROGRAM RESULTS
An in-house research program was conducted by The Boeing Company to define
the hazards and study the problems arising from particle penetrations into
chambers containing life supporting atmospheres. Detailed results of the
test program are given in the test report (Reference No. 1.23) and in the
SISS study report (Reference No. 81) and are only summarized here.
7.4.1
	 TEST OBSERVATIONS
Hypervelocity projectiles were fired at velccities above 20,000 fps through
typical space vehicle wall constructions into c.xygen-nitrogen: or oxygen
atmospheres. Intense light flashes, heat fluxes, and shock waves formed
by the penetration process were measured by various types of instrumenta-
tion. Sufficient data were obtained to show the phenomena to be dependent
on projectile and wall parameters. Debris from the wall and projectile
were found to present a higla damage potential a considerable distance from
the puncture. Tni;. included, for some tests, des ruction of the test
chamber contents caused by fires started during penetration of organic wall
elements. Noxious fume; were generated by each test where organic filler
was part of the wall configuration.
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	7.4.2	 TEST FACILITIES AND CONFIGURATIONS
The experimental facility used for the test program was the Boeing 1/4-inch
bore light-gas gun range, consisting of a blast tank, a velocity measure-
ment section and a test chamber, and can be evacuated to the micron region.
This system was used to fire 1/8- and 1/4-inch projectiles into a pres-
surized compartment, containing a simulated space station atmosphere con-
sisting of a 60-40 percent by volume mixture of oxygen and nitrogen,
respectively, at 7.5 psia.
The simulated space cabin was formed by insulating V'a test chamber from
the velocity measurement section with a metal diaphr.^.gm and adding the
plumbing and vacuum pumps necessary to establish the cabin atmosphere.
The metal diaphragm thus becomes the pressure shell of the simulated
vehicle wall. The division of the range in this manner forms a cabin
about 2.5 feet in diameter by 4 feet long with an internal volume of
18.2 cubic feet.
Two basic simulated wall constructions and three types of projectiles were
used during the tests. The majority of the tests used a simulated wall
made of two aluminum sheets. Sheet thickness, determined by boost and
pressurization loads for a typical manned space vehicle, were 0.020 inches
for the shield (first) sheet and 0.050 inches for the second sheet. The
1-1/2 inch space between sheets was empty for seven tests, filled with
open-cell polyurethane foam during three tests and fiberglass wool for one
test.
The projectiles fired were 1/4- and 1/8-inch diameter aluminum spheres and
1/4-inch diameter pyrex spheres. The aluminum spheres were used because
they are relatively easy to launch in the light-gas gun while the pyrex was
chosen as representative of brittle material. Projectile velocities were
21,000 t 500 fps. While these projectiles are large in mass and size com-
pared to the meteoroids a space vehicle might be expected to enco^inter,
they have approximately the same kinetic energy as design-size space
particles.
	
7.4.3	 TEST RESULTS
Some of the more relevant test results and conclusions are summarized
below.
a. The penetrrtion of a hypervelocity projectile through a simulated
space vehicle wall into a life-supporting atmosphere introduces
phenomena within the atmosphere that have sufficient magnitudes -to be
dangerous to the contents and occupants of the chamber or station.
These phenomena can be categorized as wall damage, and light, heat and
pressure transient responses generally occurring within 5 milliseconds
following pressure wall puncture, and extended responses.
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b. The intensities of the phenomena are a function of cabin wall construc-
tion, projectile size, and distance traveled through the cabin atmos-
phere.
c. The puncture of certain wall constructions can lead to a conflagrant
destruction of both wall and cabin contents. The damage to the pres-
sure walls from projectile and shielding debris, when 1/4- and 1/8-inch
projectiles were fired through walls without an intermediate filler,
produced no unexpected response. Circular or slightly irregular holes
were formed without evidence of cracks. The addition of an open-cell
polyurethane filler, however, transformed the pressure wall puncture
by the 1/4-inch projectile into a jagged, petalled hole accompanied by
many cracks. During one of these tests, the filler was set afire and
completely consumed and during another, the filler was badly burned.
Penetration of a wall construction simulating an existing launch
vehicle resulted in spectacular destruction of the filler and insula-
tion. The passage of the debris into the polyurethane foam caused the
foam to explode, be set on fire and to be thrown throughout the test
chamber, adhering and burning wherever it stopped.
d. Most tests resulted in puncture or denting of the 0.020-inch aluminum
witness sheets placed at the rear end of the target tank indicating
the debris can be dangerous to any occupants. Although the penetra-
tion of the wall introduced 	 ral long cracks in some tests, no
cracks were propagated by the membrane stress in the pressure wall.
e. Intense light flashes accompanied the penetration of the vehicle wall,
with luminous material being injected in t- the test chamber. Radio-
meter information indicated equivalent intensities greater than 3.2 x 108
lumens/ft2 from objects at least 3.7 inches from the pressure wall. This
is approximately twice as bright as the surface of the sun. Abtronics
camera photographs also corroborated this intensity.
f. Filler-less walls and large projectiles produced larger flash inten-
sities, while the incorporation of filler appeared to decrease the
flash duration in most cases.
g. Strong shock waves were formed and propagated through the atmosphere
as a result of the puncture. The shocks were accompanied by very short
but intense heating flux rates. Shock magnitudes exceeding 150 psi and
heating flux rates of 1300 BTU/ft 2 sec were measured. Propagation
velocities of Mach 9 and shock durations of 0.1 milliseconds were in-
dicated. The shock levels appeared slightly less for several filler
walls. The transitory shock consisted of a main shock which propagated
down -she axis of the chamber at supersonic velocities for the first
few feet followed by a secondary wave resutting from the reflection
of the primary wave off the sidewalls of the test chamber.
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h. A series of oscillating pressure waves were formed following passage
of the initial shock waves. Pressures of 10-15 psi and frequencies of
600
-800 cps were indicated. It is believed this phenomena is due
to ringing of the chamber, although this has not been definitely es-
tablished.
i. Limited data were obtained to describe the test response for longer
time periods. Penetrations into the atmosphere produced an instan-
taneous rise in ambient cabin pressure. Temperatures greater than
120OF accompanied the overpressure. Overpressures as large as 2 psi
were recorded following puncture of the wall that used two aluminum
sheets. Inclusion of a filler reduced the peak pressure by 0.5 psi.
The overpressure also appeared to be a function of particle size as
no significant pressure rise occurred when 1/8-inch projectiles were
used.
j. Thermal sensitive paint indicated chamber temperatures in excess of
650°F in 100 percent oxygen and 300 to 350°F for mixed gas atmospheres
for those tests which resulted in a fire.
7 . 5	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
An estimate was made of wall sizing required to give protection from
meteoroids at various probability levels. When compared with wall sizes
necessary to contain station pressure, it appears that pressure considera-
tions will size the wall. This, however, is true only for the conditions
assumed, namely, meteoroid flux as specified (Reference Nos. 58 and 59)
proves to be correct, P(0) = 0.9 for ten-year mission, and station 33 feet
in diameter by 53 . 5 feet in length. Since many, if not all of these con-
ditions are subject to change as the space station becomes more firmly
defined, meteoroid protection requirements should be re-evaluated in light
of the changes. For example, Figure 7-2 indicates that in stations of
diameter less than about 21.5 feet, the wall would be sized for meteoroid
protection. If the space station as finally designed has a 22-foot diameter,
rather than 33 feet, then the wall might well be sized by meteoroid protec-
tion requirements, rather that. pressure.
The effects of a meteoroid penetration, if onf: occurs, may be expected to
be quite serious. Immediate effects to be anticipated include: intense
light flash, intense heat pulse, abrupt increase in ambient temperature
and pressure, strong shock waves, and shrapnel. Follow-on effects to be
expected include: fire from flammable material within the affected com-
partments and/or flammable in qulating material from the wall, decompres-
sion, temperature drop, and undesired station motion.
Many of these effects, and especially -the follow-on effects, are not
peculiar to meteoroid penetrations, e.g., decompression with its associated
drop in temperature and/or undesired station motion, and, to some extent,
fire. Measures to alleviate such hazards have been identified by other
tasks in the Safety Study. Fire fr:mi a neteoroid penetration may occur
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throughout the affected compartment(s) rather than in localized spots as
from other causes and this should be taken into account in developing the
means of controlling fires. Also, insulating material in the wall should
be non-flammable.
The sum total of the immediate effects, whether peculiar to meteoroid pene-
tration or not, may be expected to include incapacitation of crew members
in the affected compartment(s) and extensive equipment damage. The latter,
to the extent that it is within the scope of the Safety Study, has been
covered by other tasks. Crew members may be incFtpacitated by temporary (or
long-term) blindness from the light flash, flasii burns, shock, and shrapnel
wounds. Some protection from flash burns may be afforded by a protective
garment, e.g., nor..-flammable coverall. For the remainder, immediate assist-
ance or rescue and medical treatment is indicated. Emergency procedures
for assistance, rescue and treatment should be established and practiced.
The time elapsed between penetration and the compartment becoming unir-
habitable (except possibly for fire effects), while not great, should be
sufficient for emergency action, particularly if the survival device
identified in Section 2.0, "Traffic Pattern Analysis," of this document,
is available.
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8.0 REFERENCES
A master list of the principal sources of information used in the Space
Station Safety Study is contained in Document D2-113070-5, Crew Safety
Guidelines.
The sources which were most appropriate to the supporting analyses reported
in -;his document are shown in the following tabulation. Included are those
sources which are specifically cited in the text and sources which provided
general background information but are not specifically cited. The
reference numbers and format are the same as in the :Waster reference list.
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